





Revenue from detected tax fraud doubled

BY DAVID FREED

REVENUE FROM uncovered tax frauds doubled in the first full operating year of the new approach... The Revenue handles the larger and more important cases of evasion through 10 inquiry branch offices...

Left steps up campaign to restrict leader

By Philip Rawstorne

THE LABOUR LEFT will this week continue its campaign to reduce the powers of the party leader and reinforce its own influence on future policy... Labour's home policy committee, under Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, will today consider a report prepared by the party's research department...

World airlines plan to increase fares at Geneva meeting

BY LYNTON McLAIN

WORLD AIRLINES meet in Geneva tomorrow to debate plans for a rise in air fares from the autumn and British Airways is expected to be among the leaders calling for a substantial increase... The rise, to be debated by the member-airlines of the International Air Transport Association, could be between 10 and 15 per cent...

Honourable record of aid for the less affluent

NEWS ANALYSIS—REGIONAL POLICY

BY ANTHONY MORETON, REGIONAL AFFAIRS EDITOR

THE FIRST major change in regional aid for seven years will be announced this week when the Government unveils its new thinking on assistance for the regions... The real drive forward in regional development had to wait for the end of the war...

Stockbrokers forecast fall in interest rates

THE HIGH level of interest rates should be eased by early September, according to stockbrokers Wood, Mckenzie... In its latest economic circular, the firm says that money supply pressure has come from the 'extraordinary' surge in bank advances in the first six months of the year...

Wolff may buy Chart Services

By Our Commodities Editor LONDON metal brokers, Rudolf Wolff, has reached agreement in principle to buy Eurocommodity Chart Services, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Eurocommodities...


Laker will go to court over Skytrain losses

BY LYNTON McLAIN

SIR FREDDIE LAKER warned as his Skytrain service from London to New York resumed at the weekend that he was 'determined to go to court' to regain the £7m in revenue his airline lost as a result of the U.S. order which grounded his DC-10s nearly a month ago...

Commissioners

As a consequence of the Act, two commissioners were appointed to promote economic development. One looked after central Scotland and the other the North East of England, West Cumberland and South Wales... Macmillan's 'never had it so good' approach was true for large parts of the country as the 'fifties' turned into the 'sixties'...



Durham House, University of Durham. Architects: Architects Co-Partnership.

Who built a modern university to rub shoulders with a Norman Cathedral?

An architect must tread carefully designing buildings to live in the shadow of a cathedral which has dominated the scene for 800 years... If the new University buildings at Durham had aped the Norman Cathedral, the result would have been a denial of function...

The greater part of the new buildings at Durham University have been built by John Laing... They include departmental accommodation for Departments in the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, the Engineering Science building, three colleges and Dunelm House...

Educational building is not a Laing 'speciality'. This advertisement could have featured Laing's unique experience of building today's cathedrals (Coventry, and the new Catholic Cathedral of Clifton, Bristol)... More than 20,000 people make Laing one of the biggest construction companies in the world...

lies not in our numbers, but in our expertise, and our understanding of how man can improve and not deteriorate his environment by construction... Perhaps we should qualify it, and say better ideas.

LAING make ideas take shape

UK NEWS

LABOUR

Paintmakers expect prices to rise 32%

BY SUE CAMERON, CHEMICALS CORRESPONDENT

THE UK Paintmakers' Association expects industrial paints and coatings prices to rise by at least 32 per cent by the end of the year following the increases in oil-based raw material costs.

Motor overdrives could save 10% more fuel

BY KENNETH GOODING, MOTOR INDUSTRY CORRESPONDENT

A BRITISH invention which dates back to 1947 could save the UK £2m a day in oil costs, it is claimed.

Slow progress made in saving fuel

COMMON MARKET attempts to organise an energy conservation programme in the past five years have made "slow progress", admits a House of Lords committee report.

CONTRACTS AND TENDERS

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF OIL & MINERAL RESOURCES General Company of Homs Refinery CALL FOR TENDER NO. 79097 HOMS - VI REFINERY EXTENSION

THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN JORDAN ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY SOUTH JORDAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT STAGE I - KARAK STAGE II AND SOUTH GHOR RURAL ELECTRIFICATION

SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LTD. TENDER NOTICE Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited invites tenders from manufacturers for supply of Steel Linspipe on C & F Karachi Pakistan basis, as under:-

Attack on unions denied by Prior

BY PHILIP RAWSTORNE

THERE was no question of the Government mounting an attack on the basic rights of trade unionists, Mr. James Prior, Employment Secretary, said at the weekend.

West Midlands drive to cut car commuting

FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTER

AN ENERGY campaign to persuade motorists to leave their cars at home is being launched this week by the West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive.

U.S. engineering plant for Belfast

BY OUR BELFAST CORRESPONDENT

A U.S. Engineering Company is expected shortly to announce that it will establish its first European manufacturing plant in Belfast, providing jobs for up to 300 skilled workers.

Arbitration may satisfy technicians

By Our Labour Correspondent

THE POSSIBILITY of conciliation in the Civil Service technicians' dispute has been raised by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants.

Printers delay the Economist

PUBLICATION of the current issue of the Economist, delayed because of a dispute at the company's printing works in Brentford, is expected to be completed today.

Teachers to fight staff cuts

BY ALAN PIKE, LABOUR CORRESPONDENT

THE NATIONAL Union of Teachers' executive is to urge "strong opposition and action" if Government spending cuts lead to reducing staffing levels in the new academic year.

Tory compromise on local authority clash

BY PAUL TAYLOR

THE GOVERNMENT will announce a carefully devised compromise solution to the competing demands of two rival Conservative-controlled local authority associations this week.

Oxfam income rises by 26% to £9.7m

BY PAUL TAYLOR

OXFAM, the UK-based overseas charity, increased its income by 26 per cent to £9.7m in 1978-79 and its disposable income, after allowing for costs, increased by £1.7m to £8m.

LOCAL AUTHORITY BOND TABLE Annual Interest gross pay- Minimum of Life interest- able sum bond

Teachers to fight staff cuts

BY ALAN PIKE, LABOUR CORRESPONDENT

THE NATIONAL Union of Teachers' executive is to urge "strong opposition and action" if Government spending cuts lead to reducing staffing levels in the new academic year.

CBI makes its commitment to equal opportunity


BY LISA WOOD

THE CONFEDERATION of British Industry yesterday formally stated its commitment to the principle of equal opportunity in employment and called for its members to take positive action in that field.

NUJ expulsions reach 390

THE NUMBER of National Union of Journalists members expelled during the nationwide Gerry Aerns and Harold Pearson, who resigned as executive members

EXHIBITIONS FIND OUT ABOUT MICRO PROCESSORS CONFERENCE HOTELS MINI-CONFERENCES BOURNEMOUTH MOAT HOUSE RESERVE ASSETS FUND DIVIDEND COUPON No. 1 ART GALLERIES COMPANY NOTICES PUBLIC NOTICES CLUBS








A cry for help from small U.S. innovators

BY CHRISTOPHER LORENZ


ONE OF THE most intensely studied documents in Whitehall and Westminster over the last few weeks has been a report from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology...



domestic policy review on industrial innovation. Now the argument has been taken a stage further by a last-minute submission to the policy review by the select group of small businessmen who were invited to take part in the consultation process.

EXECUTIVE HEALTH BY DR. DAVID CARRICK

Season of skin discontent



A PARTICULARLY despairing moment in the average doctor's day comes when a patient displays a rash; and during the past few weeks there have been many despairing moments. Unless the rash is accompanied by other evident signs and symptoms, when the combination safely provides a diagnosis such as rubella or scarletina etc., much delving into minds and books may be required before an intelligent guess can be made.

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
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Theatre Upstairs

Marie and Bruce

by MICHAEL COVENEY

Wallace Shawn is an American actor and playwright whose... Marie and Bruce... a play by Wallace Shawn...

beauty of Mr. Shawn's writing... Marie and Bruce... a play by Wallace Shawn...

There is a lot of faecal imagery... Marie and Bruce... a play by Wallace Shawn...

Architecture

Sheer aesthetic pleasure

by COLIN AMERY

The Architectural Association... Sheer aesthetic pleasure... a review by Colin Amery...

What does shine through this... Sheer aesthetic pleasure... a review by Colin Amery...

the interaction of form and... Sheer aesthetic pleasure... a review by Colin Amery...



Thomas Yang and Ann Dickie in "Celebration"

Sadler's Wells

Night with Waning Moon

by CLEMENT CRISP

The worst thing about... Night with Waning Moon... a review by Clement Crisp...

cast reappear cloaked before... Night with Waning Moon... a review by Clement Crisp...



Philip Donaghy and Stephanie Fayerman

Round House

Prometheus

by B. A. YOUNG

The Round House auditorium... Prometheus... a review by B. A. Young...

figures (built from wire and... Prometheus... a review by B. A. Young...

less trouble raising a score... Prometheus... a review by B. A. Young...

Berliner Theatertreffen

Women, women, women

by RONALD HOLLOWAY

Perhaps it was only a coincidence... Women, women, women... a review by Ronald Holloway...

critics in the jury will have... Women, women, women... a review by Ronald Holloway...

an obsession at the Schaubühne... Women, women, women... a review by Ronald Holloway...

St. Bartholomew-the-Great, EC1

Suoraan

by DOMINIC GILL

The penultimate concert of... Suoraan... a review by Dominic Gill...

I am not entirely convinced... Suoraan... a review by Dominic Gill...

Finnlsey gave a very good... Suoraan... a review by Dominic Gill...

Members of the ten-person... Women, women, women... a review by Ronald Holloway...

During his innings, Gower... Women, women, women... a review by Ronald Holloway...

£3,000 and gold medal for young trombonist... Women, women, women... a review by Ronald Holloway...

Under the eyes by Nigel... Suoraan... a review by Dominic Gill...

What was yesterday's theatrical... Suoraan... a review by Dominic Gill...

The title, like the show it... Suoraan... a review by Dominic Gill...

CRICKET BY TREVOR BAILEY

Gower has the mark of greatness

WELL BUILT, a graceful... Gower has the mark of greatness... an article by Trevor Bailey...

played well, Boycott intense... Gower has the mark of greatness... an article by Trevor Bailey...

Gower's double century was... Gower has the mark of greatness... an article by Trevor Bailey...

with the first innings artificially... Gower has the mark of greatness... an article by Trevor Bailey...

TENNIS BY JOHN BARRETT

Britain now faces tough tie in Italy

GREAT BRITAIN yesterday... Britain now faces tough tie in Italy... an article by John Barrett...

two Spaniards on Saturday... Britain now faces tough tie in Italy... an article by John Barrett...

facing players involved in a... Britain now faces tough tie in Italy... an article by John Barrett...

courts. The date of the tie... Britain now faces tough tie in Italy... an article by John Barrett...



البيان المالي

## Arab Banking and Finance

It seems likely that, in the wake of this year's oil price rises, Arab financial institutions will play a more important part than before in directly disposing of the OPEC surplus. But it is difficult to make predictions about the spending pattern of the oil states as priorities alter and the inter-Arab financial system develops.

THE YEAR 1979 is likely to go down in the economic history of the Arab world as a watershed. The five-year period that began with the 1974 oil price rise effectively drew to a close in 1978 with the OPEC States' annual payments surplus down to about \$11bn (compared with \$85bn in 1974) and the revolution in Iran providing a grim warning of the dangers of explosive economic growth.

Iran's revolution has been the main factor in propelling the oil price up by about 60 per cent on average by the middle of the year and giving the OPEC States (almost exclusively the Arab ones) a current account payments surplus that in dollar terms seems likely to be not far short of that of 1974.

Because of the wide variety of prices now being charged for oil and the different dates on which they come into effect, the calculation of the 1979 surplus is a highly complex business. The consensus of preliminary estimates appears to be in the region of \$40bn.

### Similarities

The post-1978 era seems likely to have only a few similarities with the 1973-78 period. Both as a percentage of OPEC's revenues and in real terms, taking inflation into account, the 1979 surplus will be of a much smaller order than that of 1973-74 when revenues jumped from \$28bn to \$106bn. The more lurid fears about the

OPEC surplus that were aroused in 1973-74 proved unjustified and the world banking system seems likely to be able to absorb the surplus as smoothly as it did the 'last' time. This time, moreover, Arab financial institutions seem likely to play a rather more important part in directly disposing of a large part of the Arab OPEC surplus than they did before.

Plenty of questions remain to be answered, however. Whereas the post-1973-74 surplus was gradually run down as the Arab states' spending increased and subsequent increases up to the 18-month freeze ending this year provide full compensation for loss of purchasing power, the OPEC countries may well be able to obtain even higher earnings, producing increased surplus revenues. At the same time it is rather more difficult to make predictions about the Arab oil states' spending even in the immediate future, and to what extent it will increase in response to the greater revenues available.

Economic commentators expressed surprise at the fast rates at which the OPEC countries managed to increase their spending to match their new revenues in the wake of the 1973-74 price explosion. While it was not surprising that Nigeria and Algeria should have slipped relatively quickly into deficit, it was hardly expected that Saudi Arabia would overspend its official revenue of about \$40bn by \$4bn in the 1978-79 financial year, nor that states such as Abu Dhabi should slow down

development as they saw spending growing at a dangerously faster pace than revenue.

Often it was forgotten that countries like Saudi Arabia and Libya had large and legitimate development needs. The inflationary escalation in the cost of implementing projects, as well as the wasteful extravagance and high spending on armaments was not fully appreciated. The erosion of the oil states' purchasing power was faster than had been expected. It seems clear that most of the Arab OPEC states want to avoid any repetition of the economic explosion which followed the 1973-74 price rises, mainly because of the social disruption it caused. They will also be cautioned by the example of Iran from pressing on with too rapid a transformation of their countries by fast development.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar will be the main contributors to the OPEC accumulated surplus, their pension fund, which is largely invested (for lack of alternatives) in the West. Investment within the Arab world remains

an ideal. In a sense progress towards it has been slow, with at least one country, Syria, which was previously considered a promising outlet for investment, now generally disregarded. Yet considering how relatively new the concept of investment from outside is in

several of the poorer Arab States, and the institutional problems in amending laws and practices to make it possible, it is remarkable how much investment has been absorbed—particularly by Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco and North Yemen.

With Arab aid running at about \$5bn a year, the majority of its remaining inside the Arab world, the poorer Arab countries can expect continued economic development, opening up more opportunities for investment. Militating against the healthy development of these States' economies is the manpower drain of both brain and brawn to serve the richer Arabian States.

In the case of Egypt, the sanctions the Arab states are imposing as a reprisal for President Sadat's peace treaty with Israel

mean that while project aid to existing schemes will continue, balance of payments support should cease. The sums Egypt received by virtue of being a confrontation state are being diverted to Syria, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation as a result of last

November's Baghdad summit. An Arab institution which is adding a new dimension to Arab co-cessionary aid operations is the Arab Monetary Fund, based in Abu Dhabi. Designed to function broadly on the lines of the IMF in the Arab world, it is gradually building up its capital of about \$1bn but so far not more than about \$250m has been paid up. The AMF has allowed five countries to exercise their right of drawing down 75 per cent of their shareholding when they have payments deficits, and the AMF is soon to consider its first extended fund facility — for Sudan.

It hopes to improve its scope for investing unlent funds by putting them directly into Special Drawing Rights. Recently it made news by an-

nouncing that it would have no more financial dealings with Canada as a result of the Canadian plan for moving its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. The AMF's decision is believed to have had only minimal effect since so little of its funds were invested in Canadian assets or

ment to syndicate a \$500m loan for China.

Yet for all the oft-reported fast growth of these and other Arab institutions, the majority of Kuwait's and Abu Dhabi's surplus is invested by western financial institutions. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority has more than two dozen portfolios operated by British, U.S., German, Swiss and French and Japanese concerns. Kuwait relies more on its own institutions, but many of its property holdings and a large portion of its equities are handled through western banks. Saudi Arabia's Monetary Agency relies almost entirely on non-Arab institutions to handle its investments.

At the end of last year the four Arabian states' accumulated surplus totalled about \$110bn, of which Saudi Arabia held \$39bn, Kuwait \$36bn, Abu Dhabi and the UAE Currency Board \$12bn, and Qatar \$3bn.

Only two cities in the Arab world can claim to be financial centres on any scale—Kuwait and Bahrain. Neither Cairo nor Amman yet serves more than its local market, and Beirut is still awaiting stable conditions. Kuwait provides the most sophisticated range of services in the Euromarket, though it was only last year that the first top quality borrowers came to Kuwait. The market has been affected by sharp interest rate fluctuations, though the secondary bond market is developing. The relatively slow rate of innovation in Kuwait is mainly the result of a degree of complacency, stemming almost inevitably from enormous

wealth, and from restrictions preventing foreign institutions operating there.

By contrast Bahrain has had to compete harder for business and has made a success of its offshore banking centre, which is both part of the international money market, acting as a window mainly for the Arab private sector surplus, and is an important intermediary in the Saudi, and to a lesser extent, Kuwait banking scenes. Bahrain, not being a capital exporter, has been less successful in bond operations, and the Bahraini Dinar bond market seems dormant. The ups and downs of the relationship between Bahrain, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia are described more fully in this Survey, but all these poles in the Arabian financial system seem well able to coexist.

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The interdependence of the Arab financial centres is part of the wider economic interdependence of countries in the Arab world. This has been strengthened since the 1973-74 watershed less by trade than by the flows of aid and investment from the rich countries of the Arabian peninsula to the poorer Arab states, and by the flow in the reverse direction of skilled and onskilled manpower. The greater financial resources the oil states will acquire this year should enhance that interdependence, and provide further incentive for the not-unattainable goal of a unified Arab capital market.

## A watershed year

By James Buxton

### Manpower

The interdependence of the Arab financial centres is part of the wider economic interdependence of countries in the Arab world. This has been strengthened since the 1973-74 watershed less by trade than by the flows of aid and investment from the rich countries of the Arabian peninsula to the poorer Arab states, and by the flow in the reverse direction of skilled and onskilled manpower. The greater financial resources the oil states will acquire this year should enhance that interdependence, and provide further incentive for the not-unattainable goal of a unified Arab capital market.

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Handwritten note in a box: 1979/15/79

# Hurdles face regional investment

THE KENANA sugar project in Sudan is now a reality. Due to start production at the end of the year, it will help make Sudan a sugar exporter to the Arab world. Everyone who visits the site, 180 miles south of Khartoum, is deeply impressed by the scale of the project and the relatively short time it has taken to create so much from nothing.

Kenana represents both the best and the worst about intra-Arab investment. The bulk of the equity and loan capital has been provided by Arab State and private investors, Arab aid funds and by a pan-Arab investment concern, the Arab Investment Company. In a region where projects are talked about more often than they are implemented, it is one that is now being brought to fruition in face of the considerable difficulties of operating in Sudan.

The fact that Kenana is running nearly two years behind its original schedule and that it is at about \$90m, costing more than five times the original estimate, is only partly the responsibility of the Arab investors. For them the scheme often has been a misapprehension, constantly requiring more finance and raising nagging doubts about its viability.

Yet the investors—mainly Kuwait and Saudi—have hardly

allowed Kenana a smooth ride. Funds have almost invariably been paid up late, putting Kenana in a poor bargaining position on contracts, restrictions on the company's executive powers have made for cumbersome decision-making, and the shareholders have not always turned up for the meetings where their presence was required, if binding decisions were to be made.

Kenana has been a valuable but chastening experience in the somewhat rocky area of intra-Arab investment. The investment of the oil States financial surplus within the Arab world is an ideal which they all believe in, in order to do away with these unsatisfactory relationships that have made us a mere source of finance for countries "stranger" than our own, as Mr. Abdul Rahman al-Atiq, the Kuwaiti Finance Minister, and a leading proponent of intra-Arab investment, has said.

Given the strength of pan-Arab feeling there theoretically can be no wiser or safer place for the rich Arab States to invest than in other Arab countries. And since the 1973-74 oil price rise, a substantial amount of the oil States' surplus has been invested in other Arab countries though the amount is dwarfed by the proportion invested in the

West.

There is a fair degree of disillusion both in the richer and the poorer Arab States about intra-Arab investment in practice. The rich States complain about the poor States' lack of receptiveness to investment; they claim that legislation designed to attract investment is in practice often complicated and contradictory; that investment projects are either deliberately or unintentionally held up by bureaucratic obstruction; and that schemes which have cleared these hurdles prove difficult to get under way because the physical infrastructure in the poorer countries is often so weak.

## Revived

A lot of these problems reflect genuine difficulties in the poorer Arab States. The concept of investment and private enterprise has had to be revived after years of socialism in countries like Egypt and Syria, which has meant reversing attitudes and overcoming entrenched positions—a process that can take years. There may often be some resentment in the poorer countries at the "nouveau riche" investors of the Gulf.

The investing countries do not always seem prepared for

the difficulties; frequently accustomed to relatively simple portfolio investments in the West or to high returns on property and other business ventures at home, they are not used to the hard slog of investment in other Arab countries which may often yield only small profits. The best local manpower in the oil rich States tends to be involved in banking and money management; far fewer people have experience of project management, and with good manpower generally in short supply there is little incentive to acquire it.

At the end of the decade during which intra-Arab investment has got under way on a large scale it is possible to draw up a kind of league table of investment outlets in the region. Apart from the Gulf States themselves, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco, with their relatively efficient administrations, their unambivalent attitude to private enterprise and their convenient size and compactness, come at the top, and are now absorbing a relatively large amount of investment.

In the second division comes Sudan, where investment is hampered by low administrative efficiency and the weak transport system; North Yemen, where a surprising amount of investment is going ahead despite serious political instability; and Egypt, where investors were beginning to overcome the problems of the colossal bureaucracy before President Sadat's peace treaty with Israel.

Syria, once thought of as a bright prospect for the Arab investor, has virtually dropped out of the league table altogether. Investors have become disillusioned with what they regard as the failure of the Syrian bureaucracy to match the promises that the Damascus Government has given. The Kuwait Real Estate Investment Consortium, which invests in property around the Arab world, has closed its office in Damascus.

In view of the difficulties the amount of investment that is actually going ahead is impressive, even taking into account the fact that intra-Arab investment tends to be publicised while investment in the West usually is not. Apart from private property holdings by rich Arabs in such countries as


Egypt, Lebanon and to a lesser extent Syria, the main fields for intra-Arab investment are property, hotels, transport construction and agriculture. Alongside the glamorous schemes involving large State investment corporations are a number of more discreet joint ventures often just involving one or two rich Gulf Arabs and a local partner.

As yet it is too early to say what effect the Baghdad sanctions will actually have on investment in Egypt which has probably absorbed most Arab investment in absolute terms. But the indications are that just as there is no question of cutting off aid for projects already in progress, so investment projects will continue and may well absorb more funds than before as they grow in size.

The most active State investing in the rest of the Arab world is Kuwait. Relatively small Kuwaiti investors have financed property deals in the lower Gulf (alongside some larger institutions) and they often own property in Egypt, either for their own use or primarily as an investment. But most large-scale investment outside the Arabian Peninsula is in the hands of a few large Kuwaiti concerns whose ownership overlaps.

The most important is the Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company (KFTCIC) whose KD 25m capital is now 85 per cent Government-owned. KFTCIC manages the portfolios of other clients, mainly the Government, in addition to handling its own funds. It holds and manages the Government's substantial stake in the Kenana Sugar Company, where it has been an active and often critical shareholder. It is responsible for Kuwait's stake in the Sumed pipeline in Egypt. In Sudan it also has active subsidiaries in livestock, road transport and construction, while it has an investment company in Egypt which is involved in several joint venture projects.

KFTCIC also has joint venture projects in Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan, Oman, Syria and Iraq, within the Arab world. It has a stake in the Kuwait Real Estate Investment Consortium (KREIC) in which the Ministry of Finance and other State and privately owned Kuwaiti institutions also have



Aerial view of the Kenana sugar factory, the biggest project of its kind in the Middle East which opened in April this year

holdings. KREIC has schemes under way, or is attempting to get them going, in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. For a variety of reasons it has given up trying to operate in Syria, Sudan and Jordan. It occasionally faces problems because property investment in foreign countries can often arouse a special kind of jealousy.

state that is as outward-looking as Kuwait is Dubai (in the UAE) but it concentrated on investing at home rather than abroad.

Again, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have big private involvement in Egypt, mainly in property, but there are also a number of other joint ventures in such fields as transport and road haulage, while there is a similar pattern of joint ventures in Sudan. Prince Mohammed bin Faisal of Saudi Arabia has an agricultural project at Damazin in Sudan which is gradually building up in size.

Apart from multi-state Arab organisations formed with specific purposes, like the Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (APIC) which invests in oil and gas installations, the only general purpose pan-Arab investment concern is the Arab Investment Company, based in Riyadh. With 14 member-states now (Egypt having been suspended) it has a number of projects in operation but a large proportion of its funds has gone into the Kenana project as its costs have escalated. AIC is not a soft loan facility though it is not as ruthlessly profit-oriented as a private corporation.

One institution has been established to overcome the problems that the Arab investing countries tend to complain about most. It is the Intra-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation, set up in 1973 and based in Kuwait. It was initially slow

to get under way until Saudi Arabia joined in 1977 and boosted its capital. It now has 18 members and with a capital of KD 21.5m can provide insurance cover for direct investment loans, portfolio investments and construction equipment against the risks of confiscation and nationalisation, transferability of funds and the possibility of war and revolution. It is also moving into export guarantee insurance to help nascent Arab exporters.

With most of its operations in Egypt the IAIGC has not expelled Egypt from its membership. By the end of last year the IAIGC had issued KD 20m worth of guarantees, and expected to fulfil its quota of KD 17m this year, being allowed to go up to KD 107m (five times capital) over a five-year period. A major constraint on the IAIGC is its small capital and the fact that no guarantee operation can exceed 20 per cent of its capital. This means that it can only go up to KD 4.3m in its coverage of any one project (though it can insure part of a project). The IAIGC has been relatively slow to catch on but is now trying to sell itself more vigorously. The main problem is that it cannot offer protection against bureaucratic delay and obstruction, which often masks political opposition, and is one of the worst constraints on intra-Arab investment.

James Buxton

## No centre

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

the western offshore banking units (OBUs) in Bahrain had been borrowing KDs cheap to buy dollars. Evidence suggests that the OBUs were in good company—none other than the Kuwaiti houses—and many private individuals were doing exactly the same thing.

But the quality of the borrowers tapping this sector has improved, the latest arrival being a prime Japanese company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The volume of bonds has also risen though it is not yet clear whether last year's record volume will be bettered in 1979.

The secondary market, meanwhile, is developing but much still rests on the shoulders of the Arab Company for Trading and Securities (ACTS), which

remains the only real market maker in KD bonds. As the number of holders of KD bonds slowly grows, especially outside the Gulf area, the number of market-makers is bound to increase. Less than 50m of KD denominated bonds are believed to be held outside Kuwait.

In Bahrain the emphasis remains on foreign exchange activities. The Bahraini denominated bond market has been dormant for the past 12 months; there has not been a single issue. Bahrain is constrained by the behaviour of neighbouring Kuwait, which has taken steps to ensure that the OBUs are no longer in such a strong position to borrow KDs and lend them back to Kuwaiti

borrowers. In addition, as the number of new contracts for building in the area tend to shrink, the opportunities for financing diminish.

The increase in oil revenue this year is unlikely to improve prospects very much. While the heavily capital-absorbing countries will be able to increase spending rapidly, the lower capital-absorbing countries (Kuwait and Qatar in particular) now perceive little value in attempts to keep spending up at a high rate as their economic planners, encountering various development constraints, are uncertain about investment in new industries.

Francis Giles

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ARAB BANKING AND FINANCE VI


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WHEN TWO weeks ago Saudi Arabia announced its intention of raising output above the official ceiling of 8.5m barrels a day for its main fields, the reason given was that it needed finance for its development programme.

The explanation seemed designed to placate other members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The prime motive, it was assumed, was to stabilise the new price structure set last year. The fact is, however, that the Kingdom is very cautious in appraising its riches in relation to long-term development.

It is difficult to make any predictions about the income or the surpluses of any OPEC member. For Saudi Arabia this is particularly so because it is not known whether it will produce at 8.5m b/d for any period of time beyond the third quarter of 1979, regardless of the chances of a further upward revision of prices next year. But at the basic price of \$18. per barrel for Arabian Light, the rate of 8.5m b/d from the main Saudi fields alone would give a revenue of rather more than \$50bn in 1979-80. In addition, there is the income from the Neutral Zone fields, sales of natural gas liquids and the added value of products refined at Ras Tanura.

Total oil revenue for 1978-80 should verge on \$60bn even if there is no further price increase and the Kingdom reverts after the third quarter to the 8.5m b/d limit imposed on the Arabian American Oil Company's output. As it happens, total Saudi expenditure for the fiscal year that began late in May has been set at SR180bn (\$47bn) to which must be added another SR29.7bn (\$8.75bn) in respect of autonomous public agencies.

In effect, appropriations more or less cover anticipated oil revenue—which was estimated before the recent price increases. Last year it covered 86.9 per cent of the total with the balance coming from income from foreign assets, customs dues and taxes on foreign companies.

In announcing the new Budget the Ministry of Finance and National Economy issued a statement revealing expenditure to have exceeded revenue in 1978-79 by SR14.25bn (\$4.27bn). The deficit, it was said, was made up from the State General Reserve although it is not clear whether this involved drawing upon any of the Kingdom's foreign assets.

Thus, against all expectations, Saudi Arabia in the fourth year of its 2nd 1975-80 Five Year Plan—that was originally scoffed at by many commentators as ambitious and grandiose—was in deficit. By then spending of about SR 400bn would have approached the targets of nearly SR 500bn set out in the development programme. The inflation was very much higher than the 16 per cent factor built

into the plan's projections but nevertheless the performance has been impressive.

Over the past two years Saudi revenue and expenditure have come into balance in a remarkable way. Since the 1978-80 budget was drawn up, the price of crude oil—at the floor of the two-tier price structure agreed upon last month in Geneva—has risen by 23 per cent.

At the best of times and in all respects the Saudi Government is profoundly cautious. The official line is still that in the long-term the Kingdom is not a surplus state and in the long term all excess revenue will be required for the Kingdom's development.

Nevertheless, despite the size of accumulated foreign assets that amounted to at least \$50bn at the end of 1978 policy has been to cover expenditure from current revenue. After four years of substantial but falling surpluses in the wake of the 1973-74 price explosion, the Kingdom seemed almost alarmed to find itself in equilibrium.

Saudi Arabia remains, its habitually cautious, and probably indefinite future—given the prospects for supplies—it will not suffer any liquidity problems. Despite its ability to absorb and the enormity of its hydrocarbon-based industrialisation plans, together with the associated infrastructure, the prospect once again is for a steady increase in the Kingdom's accumulated surplus. Its present nature and deployment is discussed in detail in the article on surpluses on Page 2.

## Rash

It would be rash to predict how long and to what extent Saudi Arabia will remain a surplus state of its present proportions. For the time being it remains a passive member of the world's financial markets despite the size of its official reserves which are handled by a host of intermediaries under SAMA's direction.

Policy is opposed to the interest nationalisation of the Saudi riyal, though it is now one of the currencies making up the I.M.R.'s SDR basket. At the same time the pricing of contracts in riyals has created a market for the riyal that has been a major pre-occupation of Bahrain's off-shore banking system.

As a capital market, Saudi Arabia is still at a very embryonic stage. SAMA took the initiative in 1975 in establishing the London-based Saudi International Bank which is now in its third year of operations and took a 50 per cent stake in it. The 21 per cent shares held by the National Commercial Bank and the Riyadh Bank give overall Saudi majority control while the balance of the equity is owned by foreign partners. The main objective was to gain experience in the international markets and SIB is in

no way a vehicle for the exploiting of surplus Saudi assets, public or private.

Faced with the demand for riyals and the challenge of Bahrain, SAMA allowed the Riyadh Bank to set up an OBU joint venture with Credit Lyonnais and has authorised the National Commercial Bank to start operating there. For its part, the latter has begun to share among the Arab institutions leading and co-managing syndicated loans and Eurobond issues.

However, SAMA has discouraged foreign riyal issues—preferring to limit them to Arab governments or state-sponsored institutions while insisting that Saudi banks should be involved in co-management and contribute at least 50 per cent of the funds.

SAMA has also facilitated the borrowing of riyals within the Kingdom itself—but only on the assurance that the credit is used solely in the country. Increasingly, Saudi banks have been engaged in the syndication of performance bond and advance payment guarantees for international undertakings in Saudi Arabia.

The commercial banks have also begun in a small way to extend medium-term loans for projects within the country itself.

In this respect SAMA recognised a gap in the market by giving the go-ahead for the establishment in 1976 of the Saudi Investment Banking Corporation, which is 65 per cent nationally and 35 per cent foreign-owned. Set up as a merchant bank it is now operating successfully but has so far failed—as was the intention—of acting as a catalyst for the creation of other financial institutions.

As far as finance for internal development in the private sector is concerned, the Saudi scene has in the past few years been very much dominated by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund and the Real Estate Development Fund, both offering credit with only a 2 per cent administrative fee and concessionary repayment terms together amounting to substantial subsidies.

Since it started lending operations five years ago SIDA would have committed more than SR10bn for industrial projects and SR15bn for electricity generation, the bulk of which has been disbursed. From its foundation in 1974 to the end of 1978 the Real Estate Development Fund charged a mere 2 per cent on easy repayment terms, worth no less than SR 3.8bn.

The "Saudiisation" of the banks operating in the Kingdom—a goal long pursued by SAMA—has now all but been achieved with only details of the agreement with Citicorp waiting to be finalised. Over the past few years the British Bank of the Middle East, the Banque de l'Indochine, the General Bank of the Netherlands, the National Bank of Pakistan, the Banque du Liban et d'Outre Mer and, finally this summer, the Arab Bank have all conceded 60 per cent local majority ownership and accepted Saudi boards of directors, while continuing to run operations under management contracts.

Apart from creating a stronger capital base the result should be a more rapid extension of the banking system outside the main urban centres to the rural areas.

For a country that had almost no banking system 25 years ago the expansion has been remarkable and orderly, under tight supervision by SAMA. The business of the commercial banks remains predominantly retail with trade accounting for rather more than a third of credit advanced and construction more than a quarter.

Last year claims on the private sector rose by 42 per cent to SR 14.4bn, a rapid growth compared with the marginal rise of the previous year when a squeeze was applied. Demand deposits grew by 93 per cent to SR 27.9bn. Foreign assets were up 40 per cent at the end of last year to SR 13.58bn—rather more than double foreign liabilities. In commercial banking terms, too, Saudi Arabia is very much a surplus state.

Richard Johns

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## KUWAIT

# A danger of complacency

THOUGHTFUL KUWAITIS considering the future of their State—the world's richest per head of population—express concern at the ever-growing money mountain in their midst. In no sector is this concern about the future more justified than in commercial banking.

The State's six commercial banks, flush with liquidity and on paper numbers among the world's richest banks, are entering a period in which profitable lending opportunities, both domestic and international, seem likely to be scarce. The world at large is unlikely to move out of its economic recession, especially after the latest OPEC decisions and in any case Kuwait as a financial centre is facing competition from Bahrain's offshore banking sector and potential competition from Saudi Arabia.

Kuwait's bankers and finance managers have long prided themselves on their prudence, caution and conservatism. It is possible that these classic banking virtues may have bred a certain complacency, and that the erstwhile mercantile flair of Kuwaiti bankers is taking second place to a belief in bureaucratic controls.

Yet the average Kuwaiti investor finds it difficult to believe that all is not for the best in the best of all Kuwaiti worlds. Conditioned to the presumption that Kuwaiti banks and financial institutions are leaders in the Arab world, the Kuwaiti investor sees the 1978 profit of the National Bank of Kuwait for example, reaching KD 7.5m, up over KD 2m from the KD 5.06m of 1977. The Commercial Bank of Kuwait made a profit of KD 4.92m in 1978 against KD 4.18m in 1977. The Al Ahli Bank made a profit of KD 3.025m in 1978, announcing in its report for the year that it intends to raise its capital from KD 92m to KD 122m. Other leading financial institutions are also increasing their capital.

In addition to higher profits on his bank shares, the Kuwaiti investor is also gratified to see that the Kuwait Stock Exchange values these shares at a higher figure than ever before. Stock market valuations in Kuwait put the National Bank of Kuwait, the Commercial Bank of Kuwait, the Gulf Bank and the Al Ahli Bank among the world's giants, on a par with the market value of the biggest U.S. banks.

If a cynical foreigner points to the narrowness of the Kuwaiti stock market and the fact that only Kuwaiti citizens may buy and sell shares, with the implication that the market is fragile, he is reminded that the Government of Kuwait came to the rescue of speculators when the 1977 boom burst and doubtless will do so again when necessary—a further element in the artificiality of the Kuwaiti stock market.

The Kuwaiti investor also points with pride and a certain self-satisfaction to the big increase in business on the inter-



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
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# ARAB BANKING AND FINANCE VII

## BAHRAIN

### Intense activity

OF ALL the Arab states Bahrain has probably shown the most imagination and drive in developing as a financial centre. The amount of financial activity centred on this little island is out of all proportion to its financial resources (it is the region's smallest oil producer) and the size of its economy.

The initial aim of the offshore banking units (OBU), which started operating in late 1976, and are at the core of Bahrain's international financial operations, was to attract the cash surpluses of the neighbouring oil States. The accumulation of surpluses in Arabia suggested that there was room for an offshore financial centre about halfway between Singapore and London, and Bahrain was an obvious place for it because its communications are so good and the island's educational base is relatively high.

The package which the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) set before bankers was so simple that it covered only one side of a sheet of paper: banks could set up a full branch without incorporation or personal or exchange control. They were only forbidden to handle personal or corporate accounts and other forms of financing for local concerns and individuals (except with the BMA's permission).

There are now 50 OBUs in operation in Bahrain and they handled assets totalling about \$22.75bn at the end of May, 1979. Bahrain is not really an outlet for the official surplus of

the oil States, little of which technically comes to the Gulf, but it handles the surplus of the private sector in the oil States, especially that of Saudi Arabia—last year in the tune of about \$12bn.

But about a quarter of the OBUs' business is in local currencies, primarily the Saudi riyal and to a lesser extent the Kuwaiti dinar. Because of the rigidity of banking practice and regulation in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the OBUs have taken local currency deposits and have made local currency loans to customers in these countries—such as construction companies in the Kingdom which need riyals to pay their subcontractors and labour force.

#### Rivalries

This is the aspect of the OBUs' operations that produces the most excitement and the most difficulty, partly because of the underlying political rivalries of the region, partly because of the movement of the dollar and partly because of the limitations of the regional currencies.

The supply of these currencies is dictated largely by the spending of the governments of the major oil States—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE—as a great deal depends on the rate at which they convert the dollars they receive for their oil into local currencies, since the private sector of these countries needs

to convert their local currencies into dollars to pay for imports. If Saudi Arabia is slow in spending its revenues, as it has been intermittently over the past year, this can cause shortages of riyals which affect Bahrain.

The Central Bank of Kuwait chose to interpret this as evidence of the unhealthy activities of the OBUs and redefined liquid assets for the Kuwaiti banks to include deposits of up to one month and decreasing that these were to be kept in Kuwait. This was rather a blow to the OBUs, while some bankers in Kuwait have privately regretted the move as further reducing their flexibility. Though Bahrain bankers have suggested that Kuwait has been trying to put them out of business, the more thoughtful recall that KDs in Bahrain last year only accounted for about 4 per cent of total assets.

Crucial to the success of the OBU operation is great care in the choice of banks which are licensed, especially as there no reserve requirements and rules are few. The BMA insists on granting licenses only to top quality internationally known banks, and it keeps informed of their goings on through monthly reports and word of mouth, which is not difficult in Bahrain. With the higher oil price spending in the Gulf should pick up again. The indications are that the setbacks to Saudi riyal and KD business at the turn of the year have been absorbed and the OBUs' assets which stood at \$23bn at the end of 1978 have pulled up from the \$22.25bn level to which they later dropped.

The coming of the OBUs has brought to Bahrain some of the other features of a financial centre—such as money broking operations and, less spectacularly, development of Bahraini

about the troubles in Iran caused extra demand for dollars. The supply of local currencies did not match the demand for dollars and short-term interest rates shot up as KDa became short.

A riyal shortage occurred last November when the rise in the dollar after the Carter stabilisation measures coincided with the chaos engendered by the move by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to move from Jeddah to Riyadh. The OBUs face intermittent problems with the Saudi riyal and as the currency represents by far the most important part of the OBU's regional currency operations and about 20 per cent of total business, the fear lurks in Bahrain that SAMA could at any time completely alter the rules of the game under which Bahrain's OBUs operate.

But the two indigenous Saudi banks—the National Commercial and the Riyad—are now both represented in Bahrain: the former opened in May and has become very active in the market—and this gives Saudi Arabia an additional reason for wanting to see the OBUs prosper. Whether the Saudiisation of all the banks in the Kingdom, which involves a big increase in their capital, will enable them to match more of the facilities the OBUs provide remains to be seen.

The OBUs also ran into complications with Kuwait last winter. The November, 1978, dollar package combined with the nervousness of the region

Service industries are beginning to rank alongside oil, gas and manufacturing as pillars of the Bahraini economy, which is now finding the first faint signs of an upturn after recession. If, as now seems likely, the causeway across the shallow waters to Saudi Arabia goes ahead sometime next year there will be a further boost to the economy though the Government does not want to see an explosion such as that of 1975-76.

All this is moderately good news for Bahrain's 19 local banks, which have been quietly recovering from the recession. Mr. Abdullah Saif, Director General of the BMA, says he anticipates a 10 per cent increase in bank lending this year with a 15 per cent increase in liquidity—compared with 15 per cent last year. But the banks will need to be careful not to repeat the lax lending control that led to the 1975-76 real estate scramble, still evident in the fact that 40 per cent of all lending is committed to the construction sector. Some borrowers find the interest payments hard to keep up and dud cheques are still quite common.

The first quarter 1979 return from the 19 banks (excluding the al-Ahli Commercial bank which only opened in December 1978) showed advances and creditors up by three per cent and money supply up by nearly the same amount. Trade showed an upturn with contra accounts up 6.7 per cent (less than inflation). The 1978 figures show that the two locally incorporated retail banks, National Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, held 55 per cent of the assets and made 44 per cent of the profits.

Instead, the reaction of the Central Bank of Kuwait was bureaucratic: this year it revised its own rules to make it more difficult for Kuwaiti banks to lend money in Bahrain. A move aimed at hurting the Bahrain OBUs has probably harmed the Kuwait banks themselves rather more.

John Townsend

J.B.

## Kuwait

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

national KD bond market. Whereas there were only six new issues valued at little more than \$70m in 1977, there were eighteen new issues totalling KD154m (\$557m) in 1978. This increase in business was also an increase in the quality of borrowers, with the KD10m City of Oslo borrowing being the breakthrough into the top quality league that the Kuwaiti markets have been looking for. In May this year Kuwait acquired another triple-A borrower, when a KD10m bond issue was made at 7 1/2 per cent for the Banque Nationale de Paris. This growth took place, of course, at a time when the dollar was weak.

As evidence that Kuwaiti financial institutions have lost none of their innovative spirit, enthusiasts in Kuwait point to two new developments this year—the issue of credit cards by the Gulf Bank and the Commercial Bank and the institution of Central Bank bills to drain off excess liquidity. A Gulf credit card is certainly an innovation likely to prove valuable, but the issue of Central Bank bills is an admission by the Kuwaiti financial authorities that they have more money than they know how to handle.

#### Tempted

Neither the Central Bank nor the Government needs the extra money deposited with them by the commercial banks who purchase bills from the Central Bank. The bills are merely a means of finding a short-term home for liquid funds which Kuwaiti bankers might be tempted to lend through, for example, the Bahrain offshore market.

Another innovation on the Kuwaiti banking scene is the

establishment of the Kuwait Finance House, a new bank owned 49 per cent by the Government through the Ministry of Finance, Justice and Law. This bank is to operate strictly on Islamic principles. Interest will be neither paid nor charged. Borrowers will be expected to reimburse the bank with part of whatever profits they might make on transactions financed by the bank, and depositors will receive a share of the profits of the bank on its own operations.

Kuwait's financial scene has some worrying features when examined in a harder light. Although commercial bank profits are up, and the market value of the commercial banks' shares on the Kuwaiti stock exchange has never been higher, the rate of increase in banking business is falling. Bank lending, increased by 35 per cent over the previous year in 1975, in 1976 the increase was a stupendous 83 per cent. In 1977, the increase was only 27 per cent and last year was under 20 per cent.

The reasons for this decline in bank lending, which is reflected in the ever-increasing liquidity of the Kuwaiti banks, include the collapse of the development boom in the Gulf, the recession in world economic activity and the increasing lack of domestic investment opportunities in Kuwait. With investment in industry in the State mostly handled by the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, and the finance of property development through either the Kuwait Real Estate Bank or the Credit and Savings Bank, the commercial banks are left with the finance of trade and construction, plus inter-bank business.

Although the volume of credit has almost trebled since 1974,

the breakdown of lending shows remarkable stability, with the finance of trade occupying a constant 30 per cent of the total. Possibly as a result of the appearance in Kuwait of small financial consultancies, the share of credit to the financial sector is on the increase.

There is no aspect of Kuwaiti financial management policies more indicative of basic attitudes, and hence potentially more disturbing from the point of view of the State's future as an international financial centre than the attitude of the Central Bank (and hence, it must be assumed, of the Government of Kuwait) to the Bahraini offshore market. Kuwait is probably a victim of its own success in previous years. An attitude appears to have grown up among Kuwaiti bankers that they have a near monopoly of financial acumen in the Gulf. The Bahrain offshore banking development was initially regarded in Kuwait as an amateurish experiment, bound to fail. Then Bahrain's OBUs started making money at the expense of and taking business from the Kuwait banks.

In the days before they became rich the instinctive reaction of the Kuwaiti merchants would probably have been to enter the Bahrain offshore market themselves, and possibly even to dominate it. Certainly they have the resources to do so. Instead, the reaction of the Central Bank of Kuwait was bureaucratic: this year it revised its own rules to make it more difficult for Kuwaiti banks to lend money in Bahrain. A move aimed at hurting the Bahrain OBUs has probably harmed the Kuwait banks themselves rather more.

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
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12,000,000 shares at par value KD. 1.000	44,180,000	
Share premium account	88,030,310	
Statutory reserve	6,388,480	
General reserve	33,856,000	
Undistributed profit	922,425	
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>173,357,215</b>	<b>78</b>

Extract from The Gulf Bank's Annual Report for 1978. Figures in U.S.\$; equivalent. Kuwaiti Dinar 1 = U.S.\$ 3.68 at 31.12.78.



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ARAB BANKING AND FINANCE VIII

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Lack of cohesion

AS EVER the United Arab Emirates presents a confusing and variegated scene reflecting the great disparity of wealth among the member States, political difficulties barring progress towards greater unification, and a lack of any coherent economic policy—not the least because of the continued absence of a central bank.

The disparities in the UAE are all too obvious. Responsible for 80 per cent of UAE oil production, Abu Dhabi, while still carrying the greater part of the federal budget and disbursing large amounts of aid, should account significantly to accumulate assets now understood to be in the region of \$9bn. Dubai's outstanding liabilities will soon amount to about \$2.7bn.

Sharjah's debts, estimated at \$1bn, are enormous in relation to its small and declining petroleum income. More worrying is the position of Ras al Khaimah, which has run up debts of \$500,000 but has no petroleum resources. Umm al Qiwain and Ajman and Fujairah remain humbly dependent on Federal finance.

This year Abu Dhabi's revenue will almost certainly be in excess of \$10bn or 35-39bn UAE dirhams. At this point it is difficult to make any precise projections about the size of its surplus, which in 1978 is believed to have been rather more than \$1bn.

Its performance in disbursing development allocations has improved. Expenditure on that score may exceed the Dh. 0.7bn projected. Because of a paralysing constitutional crisis—that may or may not have been solved by the formation by Sheikh Rashid of Dubai of a new Government two weeks ago—no federal budget has been drawn up.

Whatever Abu Dhabi's outlay on this score it seems likely to generate a surplus of no less than \$4bn after aid disbursements of some \$1.25bn.

Ruler, Sheikh Rashid. He seems well able to cover his debt-servicing commitments which this year will be \$500m-\$600m and with the liabilities of the Dubai Electricity Company to be settled reached their highest level in 1980.

Sheikh Rashid has significant sources of income other than petroleum, most of which are not identifiable because they derive from his own business interests—no distinction is made between the Ruler and the Emir as far as his revenues are concerned. It remains to be seen how his resources will be affected by his agreement to transfer half of his oil receipts to the Federation.

In 1978 Sharjah's oil revenue from the Muharek field of the island of Abu Musa would have been about \$35m. Under the agreement reached in 1971 following the Iranian seizure of the island Iran takes 50 per cent of the proceeds, Sharjah 25 per cent and Umm al Qiwain 25 per cent. There seems little hope now of the new regime in Tehran surrendering its share. Output has declined this year to a level of no more than 16.5m b/d, a fall of 25 per cent that will have largely offset the price rise. But the latter, according to the operators, should extend to the life of the field beyond the year 1985 which they thought was the economic optimum before.

Sharjah's income is supplemented by money from other sources, notably the port, but is very small in relation to its total debt of about \$1bn. Of this, \$200m is accounted for by a syndicated loan raised by EAIT which is guaranteed by Abu Dhabi. There have been two other such credits of \$56m and \$36m for which Anthony Gibbs and Citicorp, respectively, were responsible. Another \$100m may be accounted for by developing loans made by the UAE Currency Board in 1976-77 that could safely be regarded as having been written off.

A fairly reassuring proportion of the total is said to have been lent against projects that may pay off. About a quarter is owed to foreign and local banks operating in the Emirates. It is mainly local contractors who have suffered, with some payments still two years or so in arrears. Sheikh Sultan Sharjah is being helped out by periodic hand-outs from Sheikh Zayed, President of the UAE and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, on whom he can apparently rely with some confidence for salvation in the future.

At the turn of the year Abu Dhabi assisted Ras al Khaimah with \$100m paid in three tranches to help with the State's indebtedness which, though less than Sharjah's at about \$500m, is regarded as more serious. The chief paymaster is much less willing to help until the Ruler of the Emirates, Sheikh Saqr, shows a less ambivalent attitude to the union. Much of the finance extended to Ras al Khaimah by banks has been on the assumption that Abu Dhabi would bale him out and also on hopes, which so far have proved illusory, of oil discoveries.

A large proportion of Ras al Khaimah's total indebtedness is accounted for by development loans amounting to the Dh. 1.1bn, or the equivalent of \$286,000, made by the UAE Currency Board for projects now considered to have been "inadequately appraised." The money could be regarded as written off.

The stagnation that followed the 1974-75 boom is reflected in the still somewhat parlous situation of the banking system that still cannot be said to have recovered from the 1977 crisis. There still remain 52 commercial banks operating in the UAE with 350 branches—one for every 65,000 inhabitants. Total deposits non-governmental at the end of 1978 were marginally down on the level three years earlier at Dh. 15.625bn. According to the UAE Currency Board, 10 institutions account for two-thirds of total business. Some 25 banks have no more than 5 per cent of deposits.

Starkly indicative of the system's lack of health is the fact that the commercial banks' foreign assets declined by nearly 25 per cent from Dh. 19.23bn at the end of 1976 to Dh. 14.30bn at the end of 1978, while foreign liabilities rose over the same period almost threefold—from Dh. 12.29bn and Government deposits declined. Moreover, at the end of last September no less than Dh. 7.63bn or precisely one-third of total credit advanced was to the construction industry. Many observers believe the proportion to be much higher. In Abu Dhabi the sector accounted for no less than half and in the other Emirates a quarter.

To solve this problem Sheikh Zayed last December announced that a national Real Estate Bank would be established. The plan was that the new institution would take over outstanding advances in respect of real estate development and allow the debts to be repaid over a period of 10-15 years at rates of interest of 2-4 per cent. This would release credit for other purposes—though at present no obvious outlets exist—or allow the banks to run down their foreign liabilities.

By mid-summer there was no sign of the bank. Sheikh Rashid Zayed has had other more urgent political priorities, it is said. He may also be reluctant to save the imprudent in the other States until general agreement has been reached about the future shape of the UAE.

Paralysis on this front has also been responsible for the failure to tackle another root problem—the upgrading of the UAE Currency Board to a fully fledged central bank. The crisis

of 1977, when its heavy-handed action—following a heavy fall on the dirham—caused an acute shortage of the currency, forced two banks (both now back in business) to close and others in dire straits, at a cost of a painful squeeze of credit controls, reserve requirements and capital-asset ratios 1:15 subsequently imposed brought an element of stability and also helped to curb inflation.

Compared with a rate of 1 per cent in 1976 the expansion of money supply has been limited to about 10 per cent over the past two years. In 1978 an increase in bank credit was 1 per cent compared with 50 per cent in 1977 and 95 per cent in 1978. According to official figures, inflation was reduced to 15 per cent—down from 25 to 35 per cent in the two previous years. A measure of cost has been introduced but not enough.

**Miracle**

Almost miraculously the value of the dirham has been steady. Linked to the SDR with a margin of 2.25 per cent it was last revalued to a rate of 3.37 last year. But the Currency Board still does not have the essential power of a monetary authority to control the inflow of foreign currency and thereby to keep the value of the dirham steady. Dubai and Sharjah have refused to claim their oil revenue through it.

That was true also for most of last year of Abu Dhabi which only at the end of the year gave a much needed infusion to gold and foreign exchange reserves which had fallen from \$24.4m at the beginning of 1978 to \$70.2m at the end of the year.

As it is, the Currency Board has been able to fulfil its minimum obligation of covering 7 per cent of the note issue and demand deposits. But as complained in a recent report its holdings "must not only be seen in terms of the legal requirement but also the need for imports and 'also' for foreign exchange requirements of the system arising from remittances, travel, exports and the like."

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Powers over foreign exchange would be given by the drafted by the International Monetary Fund which has been gathering dust awaiting approval of the UAE Supreme Council. Another of its revisions would require a minimum paid-up capital of about \$5m that might help to merge, stop multiple directorships and the consequent malpractices, and help restructure the system. Establishment of a central bank is a high priority. But it would still need to be accorded the necessary political status and backing if it is to function properly.

Richard John

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
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
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# ARAB BANKING AND FINANCE IX

## ALGERIA

### Shift in emphasis

**THE INCOME** Algeria derives from oil and gas will increase about 50 per cent this year, a figure which could prove conservative if the tussle in the international oil markets leads to further increases in the price of crude during the second half of this year. This increase in income (last year's earnings amounted to \$3,484m) comes at a most opportune time for Algeria's leaders and planners.

The next economic development plan is currently being drafted, having been delayed by the death of President Boumediene and the election of his successor Benjedid Chadli. Further delays are expected as there are no signs of when the ruling FLN party congress, which must approve the plan, will meet. Signs point to a continuing struggle for power among various groups within the leadership. This suggests the congress could be delayed until much later this year.

This need not necessarily worry the planners. Indeed a shift in emphasis away from the heavy industrial sector is already visible. Housing, water, food, distribution, transport, agriculture and fishing are all being allocated a greater share of the country's resources.

In many major fields of activity the new plan will not add much. Where oil and gas are concerned, the State company, Sonatrach, is working on a 25-year development plan which it showed to Western bankers last year.

The most notable feature of

the past six months is the agreement reached between Sonatrach and Elf Paso to raise the price of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) which the U.S. company imports from Algeria in the framework of a contract known as El Paso 1. From July 1 the price of gas delivered to El Paso has risen fourfold to \$1.15 per million British thermal units (BTU). El Paso's customers have agreed to the increase but the agreement of the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is still needed. El Paso and Sonatrach have also agreed to increase the price of the gas imported to the U.S. to \$1.75 per BTU by 1989 and review the price every three years thereafter.

### Expand

Natural gas production rose by 70 per cent in Algeria last year and should expand further in the current year. The LNG 1 gas liquefaction plant, the first to be completed in Arab, the major gas base in western Algeria, is producing at an estimated 60 per cent of capacity. That figure should be close to 100 per cent by the end of the year. Based on current production levels and taking into consideration the new price agreed between Sonatrach and Elf Paso, the plant will earn Algeria \$600m a year. That figure will be close to \$1bn once full production is achieved.

Keeping track of the evolution of the gas liquefaction programme is important. Up to now

the income Algeria has derived from gas has been small if compared to that derived from oil. However, by the mid-1980s gas is expected to have overtaken oil as the country's main hard currency earner.

The gamble Algeria made of developing its gas resources back in the 1960s was a bold one: it looks, and everyday more so, as if it will pay off handsomely.

Other sectors of the economy face difficult problems, however, heavy industry's productivity levels are often dismally low. A major effort has to be made to increase production levels, improve the quality of management and increase co-ordination between the various sectors and Ministries. Building further plants could spell disaster in the future.

Another problem, in certain sectors, is that of corruption. While less widespread than in many other countries in the area, it is of no minor importance, especially in the food import sector and in building. If further plants are ordered abroad, this problem will be less easy to control as management skills will be spread even thinner than they are today.

Of all the sectors requiring attention, two are paramount—agriculture and housing. The first is now in the hands of a very competent trio, two of them are officers and the third the late President's adviser on agriculture. Recent figures of production are not available but even if it has increased

on the land last year, the rate at which the population is rising and its improved standard of living mean that a sharp rise in output is vital. Not only will it keep people on the land, it will ensure that Algeria is not at the mercy of a very steep increase in the price of imported foodstuffs. Housing is another sector where the authorities must make up for a lot of lost time unless they wish to be faced with a social explosion in a few years' time.

To help finance these massive developments, Algeria increased its borrowing threefold in 1978 and emerged as the largest borrower among the OPEC countries. It raised \$3.2bn altogether and the trend has continued this year, with loans and bonds worth \$1bn arranged by early June and a \$500m loan expected. Algeria is still paying more than some of its neighbours when it raises money. Apart from the fact that its overall level of borrowing is much larger, the toughness shown by bankers and the time it takes them to negotiate seem to be the reasons behind these relatively high rates, at least according to Western bank sources.

Even if they have not changed their negotiating stance, the Algerians have tried, and to some extent succeeded, in putting some order into their borrowing and the way they approach the market. Co-ordinating from Algiers is no easy task. Perhaps if the next plan concentrates on improving the existing plants rather than building new ones, Algerian bankers will have an easier time.

Many of the problems which face Algerian planners today are not new. The smooth change in leadership has been impressive but success will only be quite clear where ultimate political authority rests in Algiers. The dust has not yet settled and it is a little early to say how the Algeria of Benjedid Chadli will differ from that of Houari Boumediene—at all.

Francis Giles

## QATAR

### Measured progress

**THE BANKING** community in Qatar in many ways reflects the atmosphere of the capital itself—that of an overgrown Arabian coastal village. Its wealth is measured only in terms of 18 banks and 20 branches handling deposits worth Qatari Riyals 3.2bn. That is less than one bank for every 10,000 inhabitants, a modest ratio compared with some other nearby Gulf States.

Yet, as with banking, Qatar has always done everything in a more measured and hesitant way, allowing its neighbours to take the plunge so that the results can be assessed and absorbed by Qatar. When a property boom began over two years ago, the Government moved quickly to avoid the experience of Sharjah in the U.A.E. and forbade the banks to lend for purposes of land speculation. To a large extent it worked, for in a State as small as Qatar, with a population of only 200,000, economic measures can easily be made effective.

The economy is also a great deal smaller for Qatar is responsible for only 1.5 per cent of OPEC's total oil production. Qatar is currently running at 250,000 b/d onshore and offshore production levels are expected to average at 275,000 b/d, a considerable increase over last year, which averaged out at 246,000 b/d. Increasing production and rising prices means that Qatar's oil revenue for the year could work out in excess of QR 12bn compared with QR 9.5bn in 1978. On paper at least the Qataris are

one of the richest people on earth, with an annual per capita income of more than \$6,000. Yet despite this apparent wealth, banking in Doha is very restrained. Bank credit in the 12-month period ending March 1979 rose only 16 per cent to QR 2.7bn compared with previous growth rates in the 1975-77 period of nearly 60 per cent. Deposits during the same period went up from QR 3.07bn to QR 3.2bn, a relatively modest jump from the time when local currency deposits were going up by over 50 per cent a year three years ago.

### Heavy

Trading still absorbs the major slice of bank credit in Qatar, accounting in March this year for QR 1.2bn out of a total of QR 2.7bn. The figures issued by the Monetary Agency show that housing only absorbed some QR 525m, though undoubtedly much of the outstanding property loans and advances to contractors who are awaiting payment from the Government are hidden in other categories. Encouragingly, however, industry funded from QR 129m to QR 223m, though as yet the favoured occupation for the Qataris is still trading.

Many are hoping that with the added bonus of the oil price increases this year, the Government will redress the economy a little. Imports for 1978 stagnated over the level of the previous year and indeed showed a drop for the first time in Qatar's history. The

drop was only small, from QR 4.8bn to QR 4.5bn and this year's figures show an encouraging trend upward.

The capital development budget for the year has also gone up 15 per cent, though as always the industrial development programme is absorbing the lion's share. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of infrastructure work to be done in Qatar, particularly in the electrical and water distribution field, though some local contractors are short of work, and many are awaiting the major contracts, on the two major projects under way in the capital—the Doha Sheraton Hotel and the new QR 1bn university.

Until such time as contracts are let, the banks are taking a cautious line. Most of the Government oil income earmarked for expenditure is channelled through the Qatar National Bank, which accounts for 45 per cent of all deposits, leading to occasional grumbles by other local bankers that they are left out.

Nevertheless, demand for credit is still heavy and a number of banks are known to be maintaining healthy ratios of advances to deposits. Officials of the Monetary Agency say that the instances are few and are now being tackled on an individual basis. The competition between the banks for deposits is placing certain stresses on the old interbank agreement which has been in effect for nearly eight years. The changes in world interest rates have also meant that the local banks are working on tight margins.


The interbank agreement stipulates that interest on credit shall range from 7 to 9.5 per cent annually and on deposits up to 6.5 per cent. But a number of banks anxious to sign up new customers have been offering rates as high as 9 per cent. The whole of the interbank agreement has now been made the subject of a report by the local bankers' association which has made a number of suggestions as regards interest and commission charges. The report, which took several months to pass through the Monetary Agency, has been lying in the Ministry of Finance for nearly a year, and as yet has not been answered.

The Monetary Agency itself is only slowly adopting the apparel of a central bank. A team of inspectors is being trained to assume more supervision over the local banks in the future, and the total staff complement is expected to grow from its current total of 25.

In recent months it has also become much more involved in advising the Government and enacted two revaluations of the Qatar riyal this year. The revaluations totalled 2.5 per cent, and disturbed the parity system which existed with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. However, Monetary Agency officials felt that while the currency union between the three States which had been so much talked of during the past five years was desirable, it was impractical for now. The economies were too unequal, they felt.

Kathleen Bishtawi

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ARAB BANKING AND FINANCE X

EGYPT

Boycott a worry

BOYCOTT—OR threatened boycott—notwithstanding the banking community in Cairo seems to be quietly flourishing. It depends in some extent of course on to whom one is talking. There are worried faces among the bankers with connections in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. But those dependent on tapping the local market for savings or on Western funds have made few adjustments to their expansion plans. Indeed, some are unobtrusively slipping into a higher gear now that they are finding their feet.

Introducing modern banking techniques into an economy effectively cut off from the outside world for 20 years has not been easy. Credit ratings for potential customers have to be established, while the initial high risk factor limits potential investment projects. In the wake of the launching of the open door policy in 1974 the foreign banks naturally concentrated themselves with financing trade as a way to finance the costly business of establishing a presence. Many came—some 70 in all—in the hope of taking a slice of Egypt's burgeoning import finance requirement (the import bill was \$4bn last year). Their initial lack of enthusiasm to finance investment projects, as stipulated under their licences, soon drew criticism in the local Press. The local banks, fearful of the competition and wholesale raids on their personnel, were quick to exploit these complaints.

Challenge There have been changes too in the foreign banking scene. Stiff competition, especially in commercial banking, has put off the fringe bankers but has not stopped those with serious intentions from putting down roots and prospering. The Egyptian-controlled joint venture between the National Bank and Chase Manhattan Bank, used to be the yardstick by which to judge foreign banking success; but after a period of phenomenal growth it is now consolidating. Chase National has been active in syndicating loans and recently launched the first Egyptian pound-denominated syndicated loan for a total of \$10.2m for a

bring the bank-financed public sector deficit under control, but it is involving little short of a cultural revolution. At the same time there is a growing realisation that nothing can be done to improve the traditionally low rate of domestic savings until interest rates rise sufficiently to compete with the 12-13 per cent Egyptians can obtain from locally-held dollar and other foreign currency deposits. Domestic interest rates rose 2 per cent last year to the current 8 per cent base rate and Egypt has agreed under the terms of the IMF Extended Fund Facility last year to push them higher. The raising of interest rates is being resisted by the public sector because of the extra servicing cost it will entail. Nevertheless, Dr. Lutfi has promised to increase interest rates on housing bonds from the current 6 per cent to 8 or 9 per cent by the end of the year, according to local Press reports.

Last year local banks were given permission to deal in foreign currencies by taking dollar deposits and issuing foreign currency bonds. Previously only Egyptian-controlled joint venture banks were able to tap the lucrative business of offering customers both Egyptian pound and dollar accounts. (Offshore banks are only allowed to deal in foreign currencies.) This official pushing and prodding has given more heart to the domestic banks to be enterprising. It has also helped them take a constructive rather than obstructive attitude to foreign banks.

An important new element in the Cairo banking scene is a group of Egyptian banks set up mainly to utilise the remittances of Egyptians working abroad. They include the Nile and Delta Banks. Most prominent, however, is the Suez Canal Bank, which was set up specifically to encourage development in the Canal Zone.

Since it has the powerful Arab Contractors' pension fund and the Suez Canal Authority as shareholders, some say with envy that it cannot fail. These banks are also posing a threat to the clearing banks. The Suez Canal Bank is believed to be taking some of the coveted Suez Canal revenues, previously

Seven Up bottling plant extension. Now the running is being taken up by Mir International Bank, which like Chase National is able to work Egyptian and Foreign currency accounts because of the controlling Egyptian interest, 47 per cent Banque Mir and a four per cent Mir Insurance Company. The remaining 49 per cent is held by European, American and Japanese interests. Mirbank more than doubled its profits last year to \$2.6m and looks for a steady rise in medium-term lending. At present it has \$55m committed and \$24m disbursed. It has opened a branch in the southern Cairo suburb of Maadi and will be opening another in Heliopolis towards the end of the year.

Death Much the same story is reported from the European and American orientated offshore banks. Citibank and Lloyds International, for instance, would like to do more medium-term lending but have until recently found a dearth of properly thought out ventures. Both are assiduously cultivating their links with the larger business corporations, using export credit facilities where possible, providing supplier credits or syndicating loans where the funding required gets larger. Lloyds in particular would like to develop its links with the public sector companies which still tend to stick by their traditional links with the domestic banks.

Withdrawing of their support killed the loan, although Citibank, one of the three European lead managers, has made an offer to syndicate a loan of up to \$130m to purchase four McDonnell Douglas DC-10s, part of the original package.

The \$300m loan was Egypt's first sale into the Eurodollar market on its own terms. A \$250m loan lead-managed by Chase Manhattan in April 1977 was underwritten by the Gulf Organisation for the Development of Egypt (GODE). Uncertainty about the status of that loan can only affect Egypt's credit rating adversely when it comes to tap the Eurodollar market in earnest a year or two hence.

Removing the Arabian rug could affect another important reform—the floating of the Egyptian pound. Great strides have been made in unifying the exchange rates. At the beginning of the year the absurdly over-valued official rate of 39 piastres to the dollar was scrapped, leaving a parallel rate of 69 piastres to the dollar, and an open market rate of between 72 and 80 piastres. Since the market rate—despite large workers' remittances—has been bumping up towards the 80 piastres level, reviving forecasts of a black market developing again.

While the disparity remains around 10 per cent, it will be hard to float the pound. For the even development of banking institutions and the creation of a capital market, reliable access to foreign exchange—supplied more than amply until now by workers' remittances—is essential. It will become more so as the demands of the expanding economy become greater, when companies make calls for \$50m or more which they are beginning to do now. It is here that a boycott, stringently applied, may have its greatest impact.

Alan Mackie

the domain of the clearing banks. Citibank has tried with limited success to break into the Suez Canal revenue preserve by setting up a branch in Port Said for correspondent business but with limited success.

This healthy domestic growth should not disguise the long term harm a sustained Arab boycott could do.

The obvious casualty is the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI), to be disbanded on the instructions of Egypt's other three partners—Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Dismemberment of the \$1.04m arms production organisation may yet involve the correspondent banks holding AOI funds in painful decisions.

The whole construction industry was heavily dependent on Gulf and Saudi private funds channelled through the Arab offshore banks. Funds seem to be coming through for ongoing projects, but the fate of new syndicates is far less certain. One syndication with Arab money for a hotel does appear to have been put together since the Baghdad resolutions, but it will be some months yet before the true picture emerges.

The other notable and potentially damaging casualty of the boycott has been the \$300m Eurodollar loan which the Arab giants of the Cairo banking fraternity, Arab African International and Arab Inter-national bank, were helping it syndicate with the European Arab Bank of London and UBAP of Paris.

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
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THERE WAS alarm in Western capitals at the end of June when Col. Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, said that Libya was planning to stop all oil exports for up to four years. Herr Hans Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, was particularly surprised. Gaddafi, having proposed Germany more oil only a few days before. Other countries had had the same promise in the wake of the Iranian revolution. This was not the first time Col. Gaddafi had threatened to stop oil exports: he had made it clear in various interviews since the spring that he favoured keeping oil in the ground. In June he said he was thinking of stopping the 730,000 barrels per day Libya sells to the U.S., in retaliation for an American embargo on aircraft deliveries. Yet the talk of halting oil exports appeared to be a statement by the Libyan leader of what he would like to do rather than what he was intending to do, as he indicated when he later watered down the statement that had caused so much trouble. The fact is that despite its population of only 2.5m Libya spent last year at home and even though it is accumulating a larger surplus this year its accumulated reserves, which stood at \$3.8bn last February, are not sufficient to allow it to keep going without oil exports for more than a few months. Revenue in 1978 was \$8.6bn, and expenditure is believed to have been \$6.2bn, which should have left a surplus, puzzlingly, though, reserves declined from \$4.8bn at the end of 1977 to \$4.2bn at the end of 1978. This year revenue from 1.8m barrels of oil per day is expected to amount to more than \$1bn, in view of the marked higher oil price, while budgeted expenditure has been officially set at \$5.3bn, less than the 1978 target. In fact Libya is in the throes of a "Transformation Plan" which has very wide implications both for the country itself and for the budget. Some \$10bn of projects were under way at the beginning of this year and between June, 1978, and June this year some \$5bn worth of contracts were signed in the non-military sector alone, while defence spending is huge.

LIBYA

A weak system

Under the Transformation Plan Libyan planners are committed to set up the kind of welfare state Col. Gaddafi is advocating in the three volumes of his Green Book. It goes up to the year 2,000, aims to make Libya self-sufficient in food and consumer goods, to provide a house for everyone, to set up the best communications network money can buy, and to equip the 27,000-man armed forces with an impressive arsenal. The plan is in the image of the country itself—huge, it includes reclaiming 800,000 hectares of land for agriculture, building a \$300m steel mill at Misurata on the Mediterranean coast, new townships at Marsa el Brega and Ras Lanuf at a cost of \$1.35bn each, houses for 500,000 people by the year 2,000, and thousands of kilometres of roads to link together different corners of this 1.7m sq km country—seven times the size of Britain. All this requires immense expenditure, and costs are rising because of Libya's growing dependence on foreign contractors and on the 400,000 expatriate workers the country employs. Dependence on foreign contractors has grown since the General People's Congress decided last January to implement Col. Gaddafi's Economic Revolution principles of turning private enterprise into "partnerships of workers," which set off a flight of Libyan businessmen into exile. The first five-year plan, run

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Advertisement for Allied Arab Bank Ltd. Includes a balance sheet for 31st December 1978 and a list of services offered to customers. The balance sheet shows assets of £1,042,234,183 and liabilities of £1,042,234,183. Services include foreign exchange, project finance, and syndicated loans.

هكازامن الشميل

ARAB BANKING AND FINANCE XI

IRAQ

Greater confidence

IT TOOK the Iranian revolution to place the evident potential of Iraq in perspective. The fall of the Shah, and the cutback in Iranian oil production, emphasised the country's significance as the world's third largest oil exporter. Yet the introspective nature of Iraqi politics, combined with the obsessive secrecy of the government in Baghdad, ensures that Iraq's economic performance is usually obscure.

Its potential springs from Iraq's unique position among major Arab oil producers of having a comparatively large population. Oil production is now estimated to be 3.2m barrels a day with very large oil reserves. Exploration has been limited but the Iraqi Oil Ministry claims that these are potentially 95bn barrels.

Even without the Iranian cutbacks, Iraq eventually would have overtaken it as OPEC's second largest producer. The fall of the Shah simply means that Baghdad's current output is only a little less than its eastern neighbour. With oil revenues in 1978 already totalling 3.2bn Iraqi dinars (\$10.8bn) 1979 revenues should reach at least \$14bn.

Secrecy

This means that its financial reserves are unlikely to show any sustained dramatic rise over the next couple of years. Over the past two years the regime has shown great secrecy on this question. The last figure that the International Monetary Fund has been permitted to publish was for the end of the third quarter of 1977. Gold and foreign exchange reserves then amounted \$5.67bn. At the end of last year they were believed to total about \$8.5bn.

Apart from pay and social conditions, Iraq is showing a growing absorptive capacity. Last year, for instance, total expenditure on construction rose to \$2.35bn and the country is now considered the Middle East's largest market in the Middle East for this sector. In the first quarter imports overall were 28 per cent below official projections. But this year's allocations for capital goods were up no less than 179 per cent over the 1978 level.

State organisations and ministries show a growing capacity to determine their own plans rather than rely on the Planning Ministry. But knowledge of the precise state of Iraq's finances is hardly assisted by the largely blank sheet Iraq has contributed to the IMF's

International Statistics since the beginning of 1978.

It is apparent that aid to other Arab states is increasing. The ideology of the ruling Baath party stresses that oil wealth should be spread among all the Arabs. So far Iraqi aid records has not been spectacular. At the Baghdad summit in March, Iraq pledged itself to disburse \$1bn to the front line states. As the initiator of the agreement ostracising Egypt politically and economically, the Government is bound to honour its commitments. Its increasingly forward role in the Arab world's politics is also likely to mean more aid from the Iraqi Fund for Economic Development. North Yemen is already scheduled to receive a loan of \$300m, a sign of Iraq's backing for Sanaa against Aden.

The Iraqi banking system will see little of the increased revenue. The almost total state control of the economy has tended to reduce the banks' domestic role to a smaller one than in almost any other oil exporting country. The commercial banks were nationalised as far back as 1964 (the public sector took over insurance and re-insurance at the same time).

Since their consolidation has led to all commercial banking activity being handled by the Baghdad bank, which also has part in the investment of the State's surplus—through a minor one compared with the Central Bank.

Specialised banks—the Industrial Bank and the Agricultural Bank—and the Agricultural Co-operative Bank—deal exclusively in their respective spheres. Between 1960 and 1973 only ID 161.5m had been advanced by all three. Since 1974 it has been the Real Estate Bank which has expanded most rapidly, its loans for 1977 totalling ID 66m.

Commercial bank deposits by clients had risen to about \$1.5bn at the end of 1977. Yet it remains unclear what better paid Iraqis actually do with their money. Imports are closely controlled and luxury items seldom available in the shops. For instance, there is a long waiting list for cars of which imports are limited.

In vivid contrast to the situation in the Lower Gulf the Government has yet to surrender to the demand for more consumer goods. But the over-expenditure on last year's ordinary budget of \$2.2bn is largely attributed to salary increases. It is difficult to believe that the Government can continue to suppress increased demand.

The revolution in Iran is likely to reinforce the Baghdad view that its policy of austerity is the safest political course. Nevertheless, the rigorous controls on imports, combined with the many failings of the State

distribution system, clearly add to inflationary pressure which may be difficult to control.

The ruling Baath Party has always been aware that the unpopularity inevitable in its rigorous political control has been compensated for to some extent by greater economic prosperity spread right across the country. Indeed, Iraq's economic policies since the ruling Baath Party came to power in a coup in 1968 have been distinguished by the Government's acute sense of its political vulnerability. From the fall of the monarchy in 1958 to the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in 1975 Iraq was highly unstable. There was little industry outside the oil sector. Land reform struck at the feudal landlords without doing much for the peasantry. Development of the oil sector was affected by successive governments' disputes with the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company group up until its nationalisation in 1972.

Survival

The coming to power of the Baath Party in the coup in 1968 did not immediately end this situation. The Government was absorbed by the need for political survival. Planning, such as it was, remained incoherent when not merely academic.

Immediately after the 1973-74 oil price rises the Government, along with most other OPEC countries, began a policy of breakneck development. In the far south, around Khor al Zubair, vast expensive steel, fertiliser and petrochemical plants, which were largely the fruit of this policy, were begun and are now being completed. But the absence of sufficient numbers of skilled workers, managers or an adequate infrastructure has rapidly ensured that ambitious plans have had

to be abandoned. Since early in 1976 the emphasis has, been largely on infrastructure.

Agriculture is an example of the failure of early plans conceived in 1973-74. Despite its theoretical priority in development planning it has proved impossible to raise its allocation in the development budget to much above 20 per cent (Industry takes some 40 per cent). For all the vast irrigation and drainage schemes in the countryside, agricultural production has dropped and is still dependent on the weather.

Inevitably there is now increasing emphasis on developing the oil and gas industry. Capacity is now about 4m barrels a day and this can be pumped either to the Gulf at Fa'o or through two major pipelines which run across Syria and Turkey respectively. New refineries are being built (capacity was only 184,000 barrels a day in 1975) and old ones expanded.

The emphasis on the oil industry and related developments is likely to increase though investment in major new industries will be cautious and limited by the weak infrastructure. At the same time the revolution in Iran probably will prompt an increase in the military budget. The armed forces, together with internal security, already accounts for 39 per cent of the ordinary budget.

So far there is little sign that the rigorous state control of the economy is loosening. On the contrary, the country's bureaucracy appears to be more confident than ever. Such sections of the private sector which remain are expanding with official encouragement—a sign of government confidence rather than indications of a diminution in its role.

Patrick Cockburn

LIBYA

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

since 1976-80, will cost \$31.25bn when completed, 25 per cent more than originally estimated. Col. Gaddafi says: "This is crazy. Prices are rising all the time and we find it difficult to buy the goods we need." Almost everything is imported in Libya, from food to know-how and equipment.

Libya's ability to handle its revenue and to organise spending at home is seriously constrained by the weakness of the banking system. Libya's nine banks and financial institutions were nationalised in 1970, and

have no branches abroad. Foreign banks have no operations in Libya, and there is no capital market. By crippling the private sector the economic revolution has limited the banks' role. There is little profitable lending to be undertaken now. The take-over of premises has also limited the property market sharply, and hampered imports since most Libyan importers had put up their premises as collateral against trade finance.

Banks and financial institutions in Libya now handle the repatriation of foreigners' earnings—foreigners are allowed to send back some 80 per cent of their earnings if employed on a desert site and 60 per cent if employed in cities—pay foreign contractors and State or "partnership" staff, and lend for housing, interest-free. Individuals in Libya can apply for loans to up to \$47,000 to build a house. Banks also lend without interest to those willing to manage farms on land reclaimed for agriculture, but the cost of local agricultural products is still much higher than the cost of imported food.

The cost of living has risen sharply in the last two years, banks are collecting little savings. Figures are not available, no banking statistics having been published since 1977. The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) is a special case and warrants special consideration.

Since it was set up by the central bank in July 1972, to handle the massive oil surpluses and foreign investments, it has become the most active financial institution in the country and one of the fastest growing Arab and international banks. It retains its independence, despite government control or administration changes, and its chairman, Abdullah al-Sandi, and most of the management are accountable only to Col. Gaddafi.

LAFB recorded profits of \$84.5m between 1972 and 1977 and a 1976 turnover of \$2bn. It has participated in 28 international bond issues, worth more than \$1.5bn and has been an underwriter for more than 100 syndicated loans and other bonds issues worth \$6.1bn plus, of which about 80 per cent went to developing countries. It has shares ranging between 7 per cent and 60 per cent in 24 international banks and companies, of which the most spectacular is its holding in Fiat. LAFB has taken shares in three new joint banks since January—in Niger, Greece and Peru—but has not raised its shares or increased its investments in other ventures, a sign that oil revenue surpluses are not running as high as in the early 1970s.

Gerard Castoriades

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
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
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# When a Tory is not a conservative

EUROPE'S 110 newly-elected MPs arrive in Strasbourg today for the ceremonial opening of the new Parliament from an immersion course in European politics which the left many of them (and, rather, exasperated with the complexities of European horse trading.

Some felt they would need a whole new set of political opinions capable of fitting in at least three different ways: as a European, and a third to cope up the religious and cultural nuances.

For four days last week, the new members met in Luxembourg to discuss the political groups which will be formed in the Parliament, and to agree places of national parties in the European Parliament. The idea was that the groups should use the time to settle most of the important decisions affecting the power structure of the Parliament and perhaps a preliminary budget for next year's budget course for the first full session this week.

### Uncertainty

This would have meant that by the end of the week the majority of the new Parliament would have been fairly clear about the membership of the committees which would be set up to deal with the various aspects of the Parliament's work. But things did not work out quite so smoothly. The assumption until Thursday night, when the MPs left for home, was that the candidate of the Centre Right would win the day. But there was enough uncertainty about the candidate of the Centre Right to ensure that the question remained the all-absorbing topic of conversation. After four days of manoeuvring in the golden bowl of European politics, the question had gained a momentum of its own which was very little to the liking of either side.

## New objection

As a practical introduction to the many dimensions of European horse trading, the exercise could hardly have been better. Every time a new objection was put forward, almost invariably accompanied by an equally strong argument in the candidate's favour from the other camp.

Mme Simone Veil, the former French Minister of Health, was the original favourite for the nomination. At the beginning of the week, her case seemed straightforward enough. On the strength of an agreement between the Liberal group and the Christian Democrats in the last Parliament, it was supposed to be the turn of the Liberals to provide the candidate of the Centre Right alliance of which the British Tories form the third leg. As a Giscardian, Mme Veil had decided to join the Liberal group and was therefore appearing to be running under the right colours. But in practice some members of the Centre Right doubted the validity of both the agreement and of her credentials as a senior member of the European movement. For some members of the British Conservative group, the very fact that she called herself a Liberal was enough to put them off.



Mme Veil: plug in to French power?

more Community-minded colleagues, would be applied to find that they had sent members to Europe: only to support a colleague of Mr. David Steel, leader of the British Liberal Party, and, in any case, they said as the arguments whirled to and fro, how could any Giscardian believe like a proper European when it was obvious that they would be at the beck and call of the French president.

Nonsense, replied the more experienced hands in the delegation. Since the French are so obvious a power in the community, it makes sense to plug into their network. And besides, the pro-Veil forces continued with what they hoped would be the final devastating shot, it always pays to back a winner.

peccable Liberal European like the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, M. Gaston Thorn. So the arguments went on. At the very moment when the MPs left a group of British Conservatives was still trying to put a candidate of its own into the field.

### Well treated

Underlying it all there were agreements which some members felt were being deliberately concealed from them, and of which nobody seemed quite certain whether they existed or not.

It all took a bit of getting used to for those British MPs with no previous experience of European politics. For a start, there was the surprise of finding that after the rather off-handed way in which they had been treated in Britain, in Luxembourg ordinary MPs are really rather well treated — too well, for some purists in the Labour delegation. Cars are available to run them around and the expenses, paid in what most MPs appeared to regard as Moopoly money, seemed more than adequate to pay for meals and leave enough left over to buy cheap drink in the Parliament's subsidised supermarket.

There was also a slightly surprising degree of informality about the place which has the general air of a summer school for students of mixed ability. Former Prime Ministers walked around without attracting much more interest than those members with little previous political experience. In the canteen, elder statesmen are surrounded by young members of the Italian Left who would have looked equally at home in a street demonstration.

### HOW THE GROUPS COMPARE

Group	Members
Socialists	112
Christian Democrats	105
Europ. Democr. Group*	43
Communists	44
Liberals	41
European Progressive Democrats	21
Others	24

\* Mostly British Conservatives, French Gaullists and Irish Fianna Fail.

That sort of thing apart, the British members had to come to terms with the unfamiliar way in which the Parliament is organised. Instead of the Government supporters and the opposition facing each other across a deep divide, the six groups — seven if the one formed to protect the interests of independent members survives — a proposed change of rules next week — sit next to each other at a semi-circle. Relations with the group next door are not always without stress. But, since it is virtually impossible for any one group to get anything done without the help of another, coexistence, rather than adversarial politics, is the name of the game.

Members, therefore, cannot afford to be inhibited by the kind of prejudices which their electorates at home might regard as perfectly legitimate. Labels in Europe can have a very different meaning from those at home. A Belgian Liberal, for example, would probably have more in common with a British Conservative than with Mr. Steel.

### Identifiable

By and large, the British MPs seemed to adapt to the new rules very well. Most were still easily identifiable as being British and some were persisting with distinctly non-communautaire behaviour like criticising a presidential candidate for not speaking English. Others suggested that they should co-operate with the European Liberal Group only if it, in turn, promised not to help the British Liberals in their attempt to challenge the validity of the European election result.

### Experience

At the reception held by the European Democratic Group on the final day, only a sprinkling of outsiders turned up. Nevertheless, Mr. Jim Scott-Hopkins, the leader of the Tory delegation, seemed pleased with his group's performance, if a little weary of having to suppress suggestions that the Conservatives should be fielding a presidential candidate of their own.

By and large, he seemed to feel that despite their lack of parliamentary experience, the majority of his members had shown a good grasp of the situation. Mme. Veil had to come and address the group, in her bid for the presidency and their vote could be vital in Tuesday's ballot.

## Letters to the Editor

### A measure of wealth

From the Director General, Institute of Directors.  
Sir,—The picture painted by Lord Diamond on the distribution of wealth is misleading. It may be true that share prices showed an encouraging recovery during the period of Chancellor Healey's reign. But the facts behind his conclusions show that personal shareholders, those who might be said to be the wealthy, have declined steadily since the early 1970s, with a brief rise between 1974/75 following the catastrophic collapse of share prices in 1974.

### Venture capital

From Mr. P. A. Bayliss.  
Sir,—I read with interest, but some concern, the opinion expressed in your Editorial column that the best hope for stemming the rise in unemployment in Britain was a resurgence of small business. The industrial and commercial sectors in general and small businesses in particular, have suffered badly during the last five years from the effects of recession, inflation and price control. Real returns on investment estimated by the Bank of England at 4.7 per cent pre-tax are a most inadequate background against which to attract capital to back new entrepreneurs. The recent Budget was a tremendous step forward, not you rightly say that it will take years for tax changes to reverse past trends and that there is still much to be done to divert more of Britain's personal savings into venture capital.

### Help for small firms

From Mr. David Mortimer.  
Sir,—Your article describing the possible form of the government's new scheme for financial aid to small and new businesses mentioned one element which could prove to be very significant in increasing the amount of money available, namely the need to cover up to 50 per cent of the cost of an investment falling.

### English attitudes

From Mr. Michael J. Lodge.  
Sir,—I was interested to read John Baker White's letter published on June 26, which alluded to a new "English Disease" of pessimistic management. While fully supporting his contention, I wonder if it is such a new phenomenon.

### Tobacco stains

From the Chairman, Tobacco Advisory Council.  
Sir,—Mr. Townsend is, with respect, at fault in stating (his letter, July 12) that cigarette smokers are highly favoured in tax terms, while his comparison with soap simply will not wash. Fifty tax on average now represents more than 71 per cent of the cost of cigarettes (compared with 13.05 per cent of the cost of soap), so not only does taxation increase the attractiveness of their

### Pleasure boat profits

From the Chairman, Canals and Navigations Alliance.  
Sir,—As chairman of the newly-formed Canals and Navigations Alliance, which aims to restore the inland waterways system and numbers both boat builders and hire cruiser operators among its members, I was surprised to learn from Mr. McLean's article (July 4) that a pleasure boat can yield up to £4,000 per annum in profits. A good summer season lasts a maximum of 32 weeks and, although an eight-berth narrow boat could earn up to £8,000 if it were fully booked throughout the season and a four-berth boat would earn £4,150; both these figures refer to revenue and do not take into account repairs and maintenance, booking fees, depreciation (a hire boat will need to be replaced after about five years), labour, licensing and the percentage levy on turnover for yards which British Waterways Board is introducing.

### Kings and reviewers

From Mr. G. J. Melmoth.  
Sir,—I was sorry to see Lord Snow getting carried away in his review last Saturday of Thea Holme's "Caroline of Brunswick" by his contempt for that much-trusted monarch, George IV, describing him in one purple patch as "soft, cowardly, faithless and (without any) core of character whatsoever." The Iron Duke himself testified as to the King's political courage on occasion and his surgeon marvelled that the King, when elderly, suffered a painful cyst operation without complaint.

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## Today's Events

- Royal International Horse Show opens, Wembley (until July 21).
- Harrogate Gift Fair (until July 19).
- Overseas: Mr. Francis Pym, Defence Secretary, meets Dr. Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defence, in Washington (until July 18).
- Mr. Moshe Dayan, Israeli Foreign Minister, visits Holland. EEC Finance Ministers meet in Brussels.
- EEC Economic and Social Committee plenary session, Brussels (until July 18).
- Parliamentary Business: House of Commons: European Assembly (Salaries and Pensions) Bill, remaining stages. Debate on preliminary draft Community budget.
- House of Lords: Peers' expenses motion. Limitation Amendment Bill, committee. Companies Bill, report. Dealings with Witnesses Bill, second reading. Immunities and Privileges Orders. Northern Ireland Orders.
- Debate on HM Inspectors of Police.
- COMPANY RESULTS: Final dividends: Associated Leisure, Crown House, Hampton Trust, Mootage, L. Meyer, Raters (Jewellers), Vinten Group, Interim dividends: Alexanders Discount Company, Robert E. Lowe and Co, Meggit Holdings, Wearra Group, Interim figures: Deason Holdings.
- COMPANY MEETINGS: See Financial Diary on page 19.
- OFFICIAL STATISTICS: Balance of payments current account and overseas trade figures (June). Retail sales (June provisional).

## If you want to succeed in the Middle East talk to the biggest bank in the Middle East

Our financing resources run into billions of dollars. Our clients include governments, institutions and multi-national companies.

Using the latest computers and advanced electronic equipment, we provide a highly sophisticated international banking service.

We are involved in foreign exchange. We provide short, medium and long term loans. Negotiate and discount bills. Handle bond issues. Syndicate world-wide loans. Underwrite securities. We're market makers. And we're involved in joint ventures and project finance in a big way.

With billion-dollar assets and a unique combination of local insight and global sophistication in finance, it's hardly surprising that we're the biggest and most successful bank in the Middle East.

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Talk to us about your own special financing requirements.

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Short-term issue plan by Swiss National Bank

BY NICHOLAS COLLEMAN
MONEY MARKET: A plan worth about \$200m is to be issued...

National Trading shows sharp advance

BY Jim Jones in Johannesburg
NATIONAL TRADING, the South African manufacturer of pipes and electrical transformers...

AMP sees second quarter rise

HARRISBURG — The U.S. electric terminals manufacturer AMP expects to report earnings for its second quarter ended June 30...

Alberta Gas opens tender

CALGARY—Alberta Gas Trunk Line will begin the cash tender offer to purchase common shares of Husky Oil for \$48 per common share...

Bank of China to open branch in New York

NEW YORK — Mr. Zhang Jingfu, the Chinese Foreign Minister, said preparations are being made to open a Bank of China branch here...

Overnite moves ahead

RICHMOND — The teamsters and independent trucking strikes this spring have troubled the most major trucking companies but for Overnite Transportation...

Scientex seeks German funding

LOS ANGELES — Scientex Corporation has arranged for \$2m of its convertible debentures to be distributed by Standard Capital...

CURRENCIES, MONEY and GOLD

Dollar on edge

The speech this weekend by President Carter probably holds not only the key that could ensure the dollar's political future...

CURRENCY RATES

Table with columns for currency, bank, and rate. Includes Sterling, Swiss Franc, etc.

OTHER MARKETS

Table with columns for market, price, and change. Includes Gold Bullion, Gold Coins, etc.

THE DOLLAR SPOT AND FORWARD

Table with columns for date, day's spread, and rates for various currencies.

THE POUND SPOT AND FORWARD

Table with columns for date, day's spread, and rates for various currencies.

EXCHANGE CROSS RATES

Table with columns for currency and cross rates.

MONEY RATES

Table with columns for currency and money rates.

LONDON MONEY RATES

Table with columns for currency and London money rates.

NEW YORK MONEY RATES

Table with columns for currency and New York money rates.

For the convenience of readers the dates when some of the more important company dividend statements may be expected in the next few weeks are given...

Table with columns for company name, date, and dividend details.

RECENT ISSUES

Table with columns for stock name, price, and change.

FIXED INTEREST STOCKS

Table with columns for stock name, price, and change.

"RIGHTS" OFFERS

Table with columns for stock name, price, and change.

BASE LENDING RATES

Table with columns for bank name and lending rate.

INSURANCE BASE RATES

Table with columns for insurance type and base rate.

ALLEN HARVEY & ROSS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD.

Table with columns for investment type and value.

EUROBONDS

The Association of International Bond Dealers Quotations and Yields appears monthly in the Financial Times.

Scapa Group

Extracts from the Statement by the Chairman, Mr. T. Dickson Walker. The past year has been one of both consolidation and progress.

Bank of India advertisement featuring a star logo and text: Bank of India (LONDON BRANCH) \$20,000,000. Floating rate certificates of deposit due 1982.

Delay and property damage repairs

ALTHOUGH it is the injury compensation claim which makes news, insurers and the courts handle many liability claims for damage to property.

Buildings are often damaged by vehicles or by natural occurrences such as the incursion of the roots and in a claimant's consciousness, the property owner or his insurers always have to get him to shoulder the repair cost.

Most property damage claims are settled quickly, but some drag on. Such a case was considered a year ago by Mr. Justice Chetley in the Queens Bench Division—but such is the delay in getting legal decisions reported that the case of Dodd Properties (Kent) Limited v. Canterbury City Council was only reported in May in the All England Law Reports for the information of insurers and their lawyers.

Dodd Properties owned a building in Canterbury and in 1968, during the course of construction of a new parking area, defendants caused damage to the building by pile driving. There was virtually no dispute on liability but inevitably there was argument over the extent of the repairs and compensation for 10 years. It was to some degree complicated by the fact that the plaintiff had spent money sufficient to get the repairs done themselves, so that at the time of the trial the damage had not been repaired.

The plaintiffs argued that as they had been kept out of the money that they were entitled to they should receive compensation at 1978 prices to have the repairs carried out. As the judge commented, the effect of delay and inflation had been starting to be judged necessary would have been £10,800 in 1968. In 1970 when the repairs could reasonably have been started the cost had risen to more than £11,000, but by the time of the trial in 1978, the cost had reached more than £30,000.

The plaintiffs said that in injury compensation claims, the victim is entitled to have damages assessed at the time of trial subject to ways to it going up to the wrongdoer to grove that the plaintiff has failed to act reasonably to miti-

Save and Prosper

Mr. W. L. Banks, a director of Robert Fleming Holdings who was seconded to Save and Prosper Group in 1973, will return to full time executive duties with Robert Fleming on September 1, and will be appointed as a director of Save and Prosper. Mr. P. J. Manser will be appointed an executive director of Save and Prosper on September 1, and will be responsible for investment management. For the last four years Mr. Manser has been managing director of Jardine Fleming and Company in Hong Kong. Mr. Manser will remain a non-executive director of Robert Fleming.

A new Save and Prosper subsidiary, Save and Prosper Investment Management, will be formed on September 1 to administer Save and Prosper's investments. In addition to Mr. Manser, the directors will be initially Mr. A. H. Mackrell, Mr. L. R. Payne, Mr. C. R. Tracey and Mr. J. P. Parkin.

The FINANCIAL TIMES has appointed Mr. Richard Oliver as European advertisement manager for the Financial Times. He has been with the Financial Times since 1976.

Mr. A. W. V. Laurie, all of whom have been associated with Save and Prosper's investment management for several years.

Sir John Stewart-Clark and Mr. A. V. Macrell have been appointed additional non-executive directors of COPE ALLMAN INTERNATIONAL. Until his recent election as a member of the European Parliament representing East Sussex, Sir John was managing director of Pyc of Cambridge. Mr. Macrell is trade relations coordinator at Shell International.

Mr. J. P. Parkin has been appointed a director of BAKER PERKINS LTD.

The FINANCIAL TIMES has appointed Mr. Richard Oliver as European advertisement manager for the Financial Times. He has been with the Financial Times since 1976.

Mr. A. W. V. Laurie, all of whom have been associated with Save and Prosper's investment management for several years.

Indices

Table with columns for NYSE ALL COMMON, DOW JONES, and various regional indices like BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, SPAIN, TOKYO, etc. Includes dates and price changes.

Table titled 'EUROPE' showing market data for Amsterdam, Brussels/Luxembourg, and Vienna. Includes columns for price, change, and volume.

Table titled 'CANADA' showing market data for various Canadian stocks and indices. Includes columns for price, change, and volume.

Table titled 'AUSTRALIA' showing market data for various Australian stocks and indices. Includes columns for price, change, and volume.

Table titled 'JOHANNESBURG' showing market data for various South African stocks and indices. Includes columns for price, change, and volume.

This week in Parliament

TODAY Commons—Debate on the 1980 Preliminary Draft Community Budget. Education Bill, third reading. Remaining stages of the European Assembly (Salaries and Pensions) Bill.

WEDNESDAY Commons—Finance Bill, remaining stages. Motion on the Housing (Limitation and Rent Income Increases) (Scotland) Revocation Order.

THURSDAY Commons—Debate on introduction of the death penalty. Motions on the Social Security (Unemployment, Sickness and Invalidity Benefit) Amendment Regulations and on the Child Benefit and Social Security (Financing and Adjustment of Rates) Amendment Regulations.

LORDS—Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Bill. Education Bill, second reading. Motion to approve Corrigenda by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) (Second Amendment) Order 1979.

Actuaries successes IN THE Institute of Actuaries examinations held in overseas centres, 31 candidates completed all the examinations. Of these 12 were in Australia, three in New Zealand, two in both Canada and South Africa and one in both Hong Kong and India.

Also 23 candidates completed the intermediate Group A examinations and 27 became eligible for the Certificate in Finance and Investment.

WALL STREET

Table titled 'NEW YORK' showing stock market data for various companies like IBM, AT&T, and others. Includes columns for high, low, and stock price.

Financial Times 1979. Includes a small graphic and text at the bottom right.

BY FRANCIS GHILES

The dollar waits for Carter

THE SHARP rise in European... D-Mark paper that... The Bundesbank... The EIB said last Friday...

Bank of Switzerland and a \$25m convertible for Algeheys Air... Friday at around 98.35 yielding 8.97 per cent which suggested the winning banks were marking up the price of the bond by between 4 and 4 1/2 points before passing them on to a final investor...

most regular borrowers in the Eurobond markets. Because its paper is so widely held in investment portfolios, a yield gap between EIB and other triple A credits has slowly emerged...


CURRENT INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES

Table with columns: Amount, Maturity, Av. life, Coupon, Price, Lead manager, Offer yield. Lists various international bond issues like U.S. Dollars, Yen Straights, Eurobonds, etc.

INTEREST RATES

Hard currency challenge to the U.S.

FOR THE first time since 1973 the international foreign exchange and capital markets are confronted with a generally weak dollar and rising interest rates in the hard currency zone of West Germany, Japan and Switzerland...



last week after a rare appearance at the monthly BIS meeting in Basel visited Frankfurt and Zurich to discuss interest rate strategy. Japanese officials are particularly worried at the rise in their wholesale prices, running at an annual rate of 18.6 per cent over the last three months.

BY DAVID MARSH

if the 1 per cent discount rate stays at its artificially low level for this time being, Switzerland's inflation rate, measured by the annual rise in the consumer price index, went up to a practically unheard of 4.1 per cent in June, causing concern at the National Bank.

BY DAVID LASCELLES

Waiting for guidance

DESPITE ALL the competing factors of international interest rate rises, another Fed open market committee meeting and further rises in the money supply, the U.S. credit markets spent most of last week focusing on one thing: President Carter's forthcoming energy message.

FT INTERNATIONAL BOND SERVICE

Large table listing various international bond issues with columns for U.S. Dollar, Yen Straights, Eurobonds, and other categories. Includes details like amount, maturity, and price.

Advertisement for Republic of Kenya U.S. \$200,000,000 Six Year Multicurrency Credit Facility. Includes logos, bank names, and contact information.

AUTHORISED UNIT TRUSTS

Table listing various unit trusts such as Abbey Unit Trust, Abbey Income, Abbey Growth, etc., including their respective managers and financial details.

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
OFFSHORE AND OVERSEAS FUNDS

Table listing offshore and overseas funds such as Keyport Unit Trust, Keyport Income, Keyport Growth, etc., including their respective managers and financial details.

INSURANCE AND PROPERTY BONDS

Table listing insurance and property bond companies and their products, including Crown Life Assurance, Lloyds Life Assurance, etc.

NOTES: Please do not include a separate sheet... This column shows the names of the trusts... The prices are given in pence...







BUSINESSMAN'S DIARY

UK TRADE FAIRS AND EXHIBITIONS

Table listing UK trade fairs and exhibitions with dates, titles, and venues.

OVERSEAS TRADE FAIRS AND EXHIBITIONS

Table listing overseas trade fairs and exhibitions with dates, titles, and venues.

BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT CONFERENCES

Table listing business and management conferences with dates, titles, and venues.

WEEK'S FINANCIAL DIARY

The following is a record of the principal business and financial engagement during the week.

Table detailing weekly financial diary with dates, events, and participants.

Public Works Loan Board rates

Table showing Public Works Loan Board rates for various loan terms.

Tenneco Inc advertisement with logo and contact information.

FINANCE FOR INDUSTRY TERM DEPOSITS advertisement.

Federal National Mortgage Association advertisement.

Mercantile House Holdings Limited advertisement and prospectus.

Williams & Glyn's Bank Limited advertisement and prospectus.

Mercantile House Holdings Limited application form.





Handwritten scribble at the top right of the page.

INSURANCE—Continued

Table listing insurance companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

PROPERTY—Continued

Table listing property-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

PROPERTY—Continued

Table listing property-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

INVESTMENT TRUSTS—Cont.

Table listing investment trusts and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

FINANCE, LAND—Continued

Table listing finance and land-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

LEISURE

Table listing leisure-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

MOTORS, AIRCRAFT TRADES

Table listing motor and aircraft trade companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

SHIPPING

Table listing shipping companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

SHOES AND LEATHER

Table listing shoe and leather companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

OILS

Table listing oil companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

Table listing commercial vehicle companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

COMPONENTS

Table listing component companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

SOUTH AFRICANS

Table listing South African companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

TEXTILES

Table listing textile companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

OVERSEAS TRADERS

Table listing overseas trader companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

NEWSPAPERS, PUBLISHERS

Table listing newspaper and publisher companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

PAPER, PRINTING ADVERTISING

Table listing paper, printing, and advertising companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

TOBACCO

Table listing tobacco companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

TRUSTS, FINANCE, LAND

Table listing trusts, finance, and land companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

RUBBERS AND SISALS

Table listing rubber and sisal companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

INSURANCE

Table listing insurance companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

PROPERTY

Table listing property-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

PROPERTY

Table listing property-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

FINANCE

Table listing finance-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

FINANCE

Table listing finance-related companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

IBM COMPUTERS advertisement with logo and contact information for CIG Computers Limited.

MINES—Continued AUSTRALIAN

Table listing Australian mining companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

TINS

Table listing tin companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

COPPER

Table listing copper companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

MISCELLANEOUS

Table listing miscellaneous companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

GOLDS EX-\$ PREMIUM

Table listing gold premium companies and their stock prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

NOTES

Notes section containing various financial and market-related information, including company announcements and market commentary.

REGIONAL MARKETS

Table listing regional market data and stock prices, including columns for region, company name, price, and other financial metrics.

OPTIONS 3-month Call Rates

Table listing 3-month call option rates and prices, including columns for company name, price, and other financial metrics.

HIGGS AND HILL 'A better way to build' Telephone: 01-942 8921

FINANCIAL TIMES

Monday July 16 1979

IT'S INCONCEIVABLE Not to contact us, if you want a factory office or shop. Grimley & son

NEB calls on Whitehall to finance titanium plant

BY JOHN ELLIOTT, INDUSTRIAL EDITOR THE GOVERNMENT has been told by the National Enterprise Board that up to £20m of state aid should be provided as quickly as possible to finance the construction of a titanium production plant in Hartlepool...

Veto likely for NEB electronics move

BY MAX WILKINSON THE NATIONAL Enterprise Board's plan to create a new electronics holding company out of its present portfolio is likely to be vetoed by the Government. The plan was suggested recently by Sir Leslie Murphy, chairman of the NEB...

PLO likely to gain Ankara office after role in ending siege


BY METIN MUNIR IN ANKARA THE PALESTINE Liberation Organisation stands to make considerable political gains from its successful role as mediator in negotiating the surrender early yesterday of the four young terrorists holding 13 hostages in the Egyptian embassy in Ankara...

Hope for Muzorewa in Kenya statement

BY OUR FOREIGN STAFF AFRICA must not close its eyes to the very significant change which has taken place in Rhodesia since the May elections, according to Mr. Mwal Kibaki, Kenya's Vice-President...

THE LEX COLUMN Payout policy at the Big Four

Later this week the first of the big four clearing banks, Lloyds, announces its interim dividend figures and on all the evidence they should be very good. The combination of sharply higher interest rates and buoyant loan demand should mean that, in aggregate, the four banks' interim profits will rise by 50 per cent plus.



Underperformance But the big question mark hanging over bank shares at the moment has nothing to do with their immediate profitability but concerns their future dividend policy. For several years now bank shares have underperformed the market...

The next decade Looking beyond 1980 the outlook for bank profits is much more hazy. There was a brief spell at the end of 1977 when interest rates fell to 5 per cent and the clearing banks found life distinctly unprofitable...

Tax group applies to regain seized papers

BY DAVID FREUD THE ROSSMINSTER group of companies, whose premises were searched by the Inland Revenue on Friday on the grounds of suspected tax fraud, will seek an injunction for the return of all seized documents tomorrow. It will also apply for the extension of an injunction granted on Friday evening preventing the Inland Revenue taking anything further from the Mayfair premises of Rossminster and the connected A.J.R. Financial Services...

Regional industry aid cuts

help make up the target reduction in spending of 20 per cent. On selective aid under Section 8 of the 1972 Industry Act, Sir Keith is expected to announce that existing applications for aid under the £150m Selective Investment Scheme will continue to be processed, and that more aid will be allocated in the future on an ad hoc basis against strict criteria...

Weather

UK TODAY DRY and bright generally some cloud and rain in Scotland. London, S.E., E. Anglia, S. and E. England, West Country, Midlands, Ch. Islands, S. Wales. Mainly dry, bright periods. Max. 24C (75F).

Table with columns for 'Y day', 'midday', and 'day' listing weather conditions for various locations like Alicante, Algiers, Ankara, Athens, Bahrain, Barcelona, Beirut, Belgrade, Berlin, Birm., Bologna, Bratislava, Bucharest, Cairo, Cardiff, Cape T., Chicago, Cologne, Contn., Corfu, Dublin, Edinburgh, Faro, Frankfurt, Gijon, Gibraltar, Glasgow, Hamburg, Helsinki, Hong Kong, Innsbruck, Istanbul, Jeddah, Johannesburg, London, Lyons, Madrid, Malaga, Manila, Mexico City, Milan, Moscow, Munich, Nairobi, Naples, New York, Niiza, Oporto, Paris, Perth, Rome, Santiago, Singapore, Stockholm, Syracuse, Sydney, Taipei, Teheran, Tokyo, Toronto, Valencia, Vienna, Warsaw, Zurich.

Advertisement for C.A. Cavendes Sociedad Financiera, featuring Bearer Depositary Receipts, U.S. \$20,000,000, and a list of participating banks and companies.